53 should be left to the law of the country of refuge. On the basis of the discussion in the Stateless Persons Conference we must accept that the same view is also valid here. 4. The problem of equality goes further than Article 3 would imply: the Convention does not contain explicit provisions covering all spheres of life of a stateless person. It must therefore also be decided whether the non-discrimination clause relates only to the rights explicitly stated in the Convention or covers implied rights as well. The answer lies in Article 7 (1) which is, undoubtedly, part of the Convention, but as will be seen below this is true only of the minimum rights. 5. Article 3 is of considerable importance beyond the question raised in (3) above in the light of Articles 4, 7 (4), 13, 17 (2), 18, 19, 21, 22 (2), 24 (3), 24 (4), 30 (2), and 32 which give the Contracting States considerable leeway in treating stateless persons. The question which arises is whether the non-discrimination clause refers only to the obligatory provisions of the Convention (minimum rights, firmly established obligations of the State) or also to rights which a state may grant beyond these fixed privileges. If Article 3 is construed as an absolute prohibition of treating the various groups differently, the Contracting States would have to accord, if they so desire, benefits beyond the minimum to all stateless person or to decide to withhold them from all stateless persons. The clue to the solution lies in the words “the provisions of this Convention”, i.e., whether “the provisions” are to be understood in the broader sense of the word, including all permissible and desired extensions of the minimum rights, or in the narrower sense - the obligatory stipulation. On the basis of the history of Article 3, as stated above, and the intention of the drafters as expressed in the Preamble, we must reach the conclusion that no state may discriminate among the different groups of stateless persons on the grounds stated in this Article, i.e., treat one more favourably than the other, within the obligatory provisions of the Convention, but beyond that the states are free to grant any right they wish to any group they desire. 6. The problem of the non-discrimination clause arises further in connection with Article 5. Certain groups of stateless persons may at present enjoy, under the laws or regulations of some countries, rights going beyond what Article 5 prescribes as binding obligations of the Contracting States. Since Article 5 prescribes that these rights are not impaired by the provisions of the Convention, the conclusion is inescapable that, even if they relate to certain groups only, they 54 should be maintained, thus establishing de facto a certain inequality in the treatment of stateless persons which, however, is not contrary to Article 3 as defined above. Somewhat more difficult is the question of rights not yet in existence at the time when the Convention comes into force for the state granting these rights: is it compatible with the equality clause to grant special rights to certain groups in the future? It would seem that the answer is in the affirmative because the rule of Article 3 relates only to the provisions of the Convention and not to extra-Conventional rights. 7. The equality clause is explicitly circumvented by the Convention in certain cases, as for instance in Article 7 (3), but also in other cases, such as length of sojourn (Article 7 (2)), and the conditions which are implied in the expression “in the same circumstances” (Article 6 and its application in Articles 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22 (2), 26). A differentiation of the stateless persons on these bases is not only permissible but even indicated. 8. The rule of equality may not hold in regard to Article 4. Under that article, a Contracting State undertakes the obligation to treat stateless persons at least as favourably as its own nationals with respect to freedom to practice their religion and freedom as regards the religious education of their children. The words “at least as favourably” are nowhere else used in connection with “national treatment” because such treatment ordinarily is the ideal of every stateless person. However, there is a possibility that a state may differentiate in the treatment of its own citizens and there may be persons of such religious denominations which are not granted 53 The representatives of Yugoslavia and Egypt considered the wording of Article 3 as not covering every type of discrimination (SR.24, p. 21). It was pointed out, for instance, that "discrimination" on the basis of sex in regard to salaries, insofar as refugees are concerned, could not be prohibited on the grounds of Article 3 if it was generally practiced in the country (SR.5, p. 10). 54 Concerning this question, see the comments to Article 5 below.