16 • International Journal of Refugee Law, 2026, Vol. 00, Issue 00 Although note that the United States-Haiti agreement, concluded in 1981, is often identified as the first extraterritorial interdiction agreement. See, eg Katherine H Tennis, ‘Offshoring the Border: The 1981 United States–Haiti Agreement and the Origins of Extraterritorial Maritime Interdiction’ (2019) 34 Journal of Refugee Studies 173. 125 The number of asylum applications made to the UNHCR worldwide more than doubled between 2013 and 2022, increasing from 3.4 million in 2013 to 6.9 million in 2022: Refugee Council of Australia, ‘Is Australia’s Response to Refugees Generous? An Analysis of UNHCR Global Trends Statistics from 2013 to 2022’ (Report, 2023) 1. 126 As Franck Düvell points out, the majority of ‘irregular migrants’ in European Union countries entered the country lawfully and overstayed or otherwise violated the conditions of their visa: Franck Düvell, ‘Paths into Irregularity: The Legal and Political Construction of Irregular Migration’ (2011) 13 European Journal of Migration and Law 275, 288. 127 Tennis (n 124) 176. 128 ‘Regional Resettlement Arrangement between Australia and Papua New Guinea’ (19 July 2013) and ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea and the Government of Australia, relating to the transfer to, and assessment and settlement in, Papua New Guinea of certain persons, and related issues’ (6 August 2013); ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of Nauru and the Commonwealth of Australia, relating to the transfer to and assessment of persons in Nauru, and related issues’ (3 August 2013). 129 ‘Protocollo tra il Governo della Repubblica Italiana e il Consiglio dei Ministri della Repubblica di Albania per il rafforzamento della collaborazione in materia migratoria’ (6 November 2023) (‘Protocol between the Government of the Italian Republic and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania for the Strengthening of Cooperation on Migration Matters’). 130 ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda for the provision of an asylum partnership agreement’ (6 April 2023). 131 ‘Arrangement between the Government of Australia and the Government of Malaysia on Transfer and Resettlement’ (25 July 2011). 132 ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda for the provision of an asylum partnership agreement’ (6 April 2023). 133 ‘EU Turkey Statement’ (18 March 2016). 124 Downloaded from academic.oup.com/ijrl/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ijrl/eeag028/8767365 by guest on 08 October 2026 agreements in this context has been a growing trend since the turn of the century,124 corresponding with an increase in the number of people seeking asylum.125 In order to seek asylum, people often need to cross borders without authorization and travel along the same routes, use the same means of transportation and attempt border crossings with other migrant populations, referred to in this article as ‘irregular migrants’. Despite irregular border crossings remaining a relatively rare phenomenon,126 asylum seekers and irregular migrants–and particularly those arriving by boat–receive disproportionate attention in the media, political discourse, and in the public imagination.127 Bilateral agreements are an increasingly common response by states to this attention. Bilateral state responses to asylum seekers and irregular migrants provide for types of arrangements. One category takes the form of arrangements with third countries for the extraterritorial detention of asylum seekers and/or the processing of asylum claims. Australia’s arrangements with Nauru and Papua New Guinea exemplify this model,128 as do Italy’s 2023–24 arrangement with Albania129 and the UK’s proposed arrangement with Rwanda.130 A second category comprises bilateral arrangements for the transfer or relocation of refugees or those deemed in need of protection, including arrangements framed as burden-sharing or resettlement cooperation, such as Australia’s proposed (but never implemented) arrangement with Malaysia,131 the UK–Rwanda arrangement insofar as it also purported to provide permanent settlement to refugees and other migrants,132 and the European Union’s 2016 EU–Turkey Statement.133 A third category of bilateral arrangements provides for cooperation in the interception of irregular migrants, as well as broader forms of migration control. Examples include cooperation between the European Union and Libya in