International Journal of Refugee Law, 2026, Vol. 00, Issue 00 • 5 2.2. Bilateral agreement between the UAE and the Comoros To address the problem of the statelessness of the bidun populations, the Gulf States embraced a novel approach. In February 2008, following a period of negotiation led by the Syrian-French entrepreneur and Kuwaiti resident, Bashar Kiwan, the Union of the Comoros and the UAE (acting through Kiwan’s company, Comoros Gulf Holdings) concluded an arrangement in which the Comoros would supply their passports to the UAE’s bidun population.40 This ‘Agreement relating to an Economic Citizenship Program’41 specified that, in return for the passports, the UAE would pay the Comoros US$200 million.42 In November 2008, after one failed attempt and much debate, the Comoros National Assembly finally passed the Law on Economic Citizenship, establishing the legislative framework necessary to give domestic effect to this agreement. In May 2014, it was reported that Kuwait was considering the same arrangement for its stateless population.43 In November 2014, Gulf News reported on a Kuwaiti Government Atossa Araxia Abrahamian, The Cosmopolites: The Coming of the Global Citizen (Columbia Global Reports 2015) 98. 34 ibid. 35 ibid 99. 36 Lori (n 8) 7. 37 Diala Alqadi, ‘“The Door That Cannot Be Closed”: Citizens Bidoon Citizenship in the United Arab Emirates’ (Thesis, Duke University 2015) 62. 38 Rabuffetti and Wills (n 8) 79; Claire Beaugrande, ‘Statelessness & Administrative Violence: Biduns’ Survival Strategies in Kuwait’(2021) 101(2) The Muslim World 228, 229. 39 Belkis Wille, ‘Kuwait’s Plan to Pawn off Its “Stateless”’ An-Nahar (25 March 2015) <https://www.annahar.com/english/article/224039-kuwaits-plan-to-pawn-off-its-stateless> accessed 5 March 2024. 40 ‘Rapport de La Commission D’enquête Parlementaire Sur La Loi Relative à La Citoyenneté Économique’ (Parlement des Comores 2017) 9. 41 ibid 10. 42 ibid 9. 43 Wille (n 39). 33 Downloaded from academic.oup.com/ijrl/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ijrl/eeag028/8767365 by guest on 08 October 2026 issued several regulations stripping the bidun population of their rights.33 It also began applying the Alien Residence Law 1959 to the bidun, shifting their status from lawful residents to ‘illegal residents’.34 Following the Iraqi occupation of 1990–1991, discrimination against the bidun intensified due to the perception that the bidun were collaborating with Iraq.35 Nationality in the oil-rich Gulf states is a valuable status, entitling its holder to substantial economic benefits including free education and healthcare, land grants, subsidized housing, tax exemptions, discounted utilities, social security and pensions, child support, grants for weddings, and work-related benefits.36 The UAE and Kuwait have a high proportion of foreign residents to nationals, meaning that these States are motivated to restrict the grant of nationality to a small group of ‘original’ nationals and their descendants: those who can demonstrate their lineage to those residing in their territories prior to the discovery of oil in the 1920s.37 These countries view the bidun populations as ‘illegal migrants’ and suspect them of concealing their true nationality in order to stake their claim to nationality in the UAE and Kuwait.38 Additionally, Kuwaiti politicians have expressed a concern that naturalizing the estimated 100,000 bidun in Kuwait would significantly alter the country’s demography, with implications for its political orientation and leadership.39 These factors explain the reluctance of the UAE and Kuwait to address the statelessness of the bidun through the grant of their own nationality and their turn to another country for a creative solution.