Statelessness Working Paper Series No. 2017/7 Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)47 and Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR 48. The Court recalled that: ‘A difference in treatment may take the form of disproportionately prejudicial effects of a general policy or measure which, though couched in neutral terms, discriminates against a group’ and that indirect discrimination does not necessarily require a discriminatory intent. 49 When interpreting this by case in the context of deprivation of nationality, it seems that difference in treatment of dual citizens and singular citizens can be deemed discriminatory, even if the measure is worded in a neutral manner and has no discriminatory intent. In the Netherlands, deprivation of nationality is limited to dual nationals as it is bound by the prohibition of statelessness. This, in practice affects dual nationals, which are mainly citizens of Moroccan descent.50 Section 4 will take a closer look at the groups that are actually affected by denationalisation measures in The Netherlands. It seems that if a deprivation measure directly or indirectly affects a specific group, be it naturalised citizens or an ethnic minority, it can be discriminatory even if the measure was not intended to be discriminatory. Furthermore, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) adds another perspective to differential treatment between naturalised citizenship and citizenship by descent in John K. Modise v. Botswana. In this case, the Commission recognises a distinction is made between citizenship by descent and naturalised citizenship in the context of arbitrary denial of acquisition of nationality, which is also a form of deprivation of nationality under international law.51 The Commission’s ruling concerned which sort of citizenship Mr. Modise should acquire.52 Modise claimed citizenship of Botswana by descent, on the basis of his parentage and the nationality provisions adopted following Botswana’s independence, but he was refused recognition as a birthright citizen by Botswana. Eventually, Modise was granted citizenship by naturalisation in 1995. However, this type of citizenship status did not entitle him to full political rights in Botswana and so he proceeded with his case before the Commission. The Commission was not satisfied that the conferral of citizenship by naturalisation to Modise was sufficient to address the violation of rights. Naturalised citizenship allowed for fewer political rights and considering that Modise was an active politician, found this to be “a legal disability of grave consequence”. 53 The Commission thereby recognised Modise’s entitlement to citizenship by descent through the application of a particular nationality rule. This, though under different circumstances, also raises the question whether one should distinguish between naturalised and birthright citizens. There seems to be tension in the application of international law at the domestic level regarding the principle of non-discrimination and the prohibition that deprivation of nationality cannot lead to statelessness. States who opt to deprive dual nationals from one of their nationalities are complying with the international norm to prevent statelessness, but risk violating the principle of non-discrimination. This is an interesting matter to take upon in further research in understanding when deprivation of nationality 47 This entails the right to respect for private and family life. This entails the prohibition of discrimination. 49 Ibid. at 103. 50 As will be seen in the next section that also elaborates on statistics. 51 Ibid., N.12. 52 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Comm. No. 97/93, 6 November 2000 (John K. Modise v. Botswana). 53 Ibid, para. 97. 48 13