Nevertheless, the main source of employment in Jerash governorate, as with the other northern agricultural governorates of Ajloun and Mafraq, is the government, including the civil service, armed forces and public security services. The public sector is large in Jordan, employing around 28% of the total labour force in 2010 to 2014 (DoS and Fafo, 2015). In Jerash governorate, more than 40% of the overall labour force worked for the government in this period (DoS and Fafo, 2015) 86. As discussed in Parts 1 and 2, as non-citizens, ex-Gazans can only be employed by the government on a non-permanent, contractual basis. Thus, ex-Gazans are effectively barred from most public-sector jobs and usually relegated to menial — rather than what they term ‘proper’ — jobs if they obtain public sector employment at all87. As one interviewee explained88: My brother is ex-Gazan; he is married to a Jordanian. He registered his bus under her name and works for the Water Authority […] As an ex-Gazan, he cannot work for the Water Authority unless he does it as a daily labourer. In the government departments, we can get jobs as cleaners, not more than that. This lack of access to government employment is not, of course, only a barrier for exGazans in Jerash camp. Whereas 20% of non-ex-Gaza camp refugees rely on government employment, less than 3% of ex-Gazans living in camps do. Yet the particularly high reliance on government employment in Jerash governorate places ex-Gazans here at a particular disadvantage. This is aptly illustrated by the fact that in Souf camp, located 4 km north of Jerash city and home to predominantly citizen Palestinian refugees, 33% of the labour force reported working for the government. Not only is the government a large employer for Palestinian refugees in general but there are important formal benefits associated with public sector employment, such as permanent jobs, a pension, health insurance and social security, as well as the potential informal benefits associated with having connections [wasta] in the government and security services (see for example Gandolfo, 2012, p. 175). Of those Palestinian refugees living in camps employed by the government, some 99% have a permanent job and around half (49%) have a written contract — significantly more than the average among the camp population (33%). Employment in the public sector alone may therefore account for a significant part of the gap between ex-Gazans and non-ex-Gazans when it comes to having written contracts and the security these jobs provide. As one man interviewed outside of Jerash summarized 89: In Jerash the only people who are working [as formal employees in ‘proper’ jobs] are the ones who have national ID numbers and are working with the government. Those without an ID [have to] manage with whatever kind of job [they can get]. The limited access to government employment may also have a disproportionate impact upon ex-Gaza women. Female labour force participation in Jordan is amongst the lowest in the world (World Bank, 2017) and overall labour force participation for camp women stood at 9% at the time of the survey, with slightly lower participation amongst ex-Gazans As a comparison, only 15.9% and 17.9% of the labour force in the governorates of Amman and Zarqa work in the public sector (DoS and Fafo, 2015). 87 In the comprehensive survey, a small proportion of ex-Gazans in Jerash did report working in the government sector. Other than menial jobs, some ex-Gazans may also be able to work for the Department of Palestinian Affairs inside Jerash camp (the Camp Improvement Committee); however even taking both of these exceptions together is not sufficient to open up more than a handful of jobs. 88 Female, age 35, Hitteen camp, 15 February 2016. 89 Male, age 26, Hitteen camp, 21 February 2016. 86 ‘Just getting by’ Ex-Gazans in Jerash and other refugee camps in Jordan 87