sectors. This must be ascribed both to their comparatively high education, as reported above, and their success in finding employment with UNRWA; indeed, ex-Gazans from Jerash camp work for the Agency twice as often as other ex-Gazans (Table 25). Table 25 Type of employer. Percentage of all employed individuals aged 15 and above by ex-Gaza status (n=41,285). Private company UNRWA Government sector Family business Other Total n Ex-Gazans, Jerash 85 8 3 2 2 100 2,416 Other ex-Gazans 88 4 2 6 0 100 3,186 Other Palestinian refugees 73 2 20 5 1 100 35,683 All 75 3 17 5 1 100 41,285 A final pattern worth noting is that, whilst interviewees reported that many shops and workshops are family-run, ex-Gazans are less than half as likely as the other groups of refugees to work for a family business (Table 25). Indeed, the fact that less than 1% of exGazans in Jerash define themselves as ‘employers’ reflects the very small nature of businesses owned by Jerash camp residents and their limited ability to contribute to the local economy through providing employment. While ex-Gazans face legal restrictions on setting up businesses, these figures suggest that ex-Gazans in other camps may be more able to establish their own businesses in spite of this than those in Jerash, whether because they are part of a more thriving local economy, because they are more likely to have the capital to invest or because they are better able to work within the legal restrictions than ex-Gazans in Jerash. This leaves shops and businesses in Jerash camp primarily relying on the business of a relatively small community with little disposable income, which is less able to sustain a large number of businesses. There is substantial variation across gender when it comes to sector of work or industry. However, since the female labour force participation rate is low, there are few employed women in the sample survey data set, and statistics for female ex-Gazans are consequently unreliable. Nevertheless, two clear trends in the data sit well with the findings from our qualitative data and other surveys (Economic Research Forum and DoS, 2016). The first is that work in education, health care and social services, predominantly government employment, is at least four times more prevalent amongst women than men in all three population groups: these sectors are important for well-educated women. Consequently, the considerably higher labour force participation amongst women in Souf camp (12% compared to 8% in Jerash camp) is likely at least partly explained by the greater access to government employment — in Souf, one-half of all employed women work in the public sector. The second tendency is that agriculture, with the intermittent employment it provides, is a significant ‘industry’ for ex-Gaza women in Jerash, which is not the case for ex-Gaza women elsewhere and Palestinian refugee women with a national ID. However, about 30% of camp refugees who do work in agriculture, whether they are citizens or not, are women. UNRWA is much more important as an employer for female than male employment, and is in particular essential for women in Jerash camp, where 17% of employed women, contrasted with 7% of employed men, work for the Agency. Comparable figures are 7% for women and 3% for men amongst other ex-Gazans, and 4% and 2% for female and male citizen Palestinian refugees respectively. Employment with UNRWA is more crucial for Palestinian refugees with higher education than for those with less education, above all for ex-Gazans for whom public white-collar work is more or less off limits (Table 26). Fafo Report 2019:34 70