camp to contribute to a high proportion of discouraged workers in Jerash. Yet the statistical difference in the level of discouragement between Jerash camp and other camps is insignificant. This could indicate that many ex-Gazans continue to look for work, despite their sense of grievance, and even if they may reject a job if the terms are not right. This would thus contribute instead to the increased unemployment rate. Alternatively, some might prefer to attempt to start their own business than go into employment 175 or take what they consider underpaid jobs or jobs for which they are over-qualified in the end because they have no choice. Quotes from men in their twenties illustrate this disillusionment well and are typical of sentiments expressed by all ex-Gazans we met in Jerash: Any [Jordanian] agricultural engineer who works, his monthly salary wouldn’t be less than 600 JD per month. I would accept something for 300 JD, even if I found something for 180 JD, I would still accept176. When they graduate and find that there is no hope to work in their field, they start looking for any other job. Some of them would work as builders, or blacksmiths, or carpenters. They would work in any field just to earn their living 177. In sum, this chapter has shown that employment opportunities for ex-Gazans in Jerash governorate are limited, and that within Jerash camp and its immediate surroundings small business, trade, or working in agriculture or for CBOs generates relatively little income. Indeed, businesses cater for the relatively poor camp population and for residents of the immediate neighbouring areas who come to Jerash precisely because of the competitive prices. Moreover, the costs — both financial and non-financial — of seeking work or temporarily relocating outside of the camp are often not considered worth the return, leading to few workers bringing in sizeable wages from outside the camp. The result is little cash injection from elsewhere and circulation of (relatively little) money within the camp itself. This begs the question of why more of the current residents do not escape this cycle by moving out altogether. We turn to this question in the next chapter. 175 Ex-Gazans are more often self-employed, with 16.5% and 17.0% of ex-Gazans inside and outside Jerash respectively reporting as self-employed, compared to only 13.5% of non-ex-Gazans in other camps. 176 Male, age 23, Jerash camp, 28 January 2016. 177 Male, age 29, Manshiyyeh, 26 January 2016. ‘Just getting by’ Ex-Gazans in Jerash and other refugee camps in Jordan 107