2025 Statelessness & Citizenship Review 7(1) census largely through the United Nations Population Fund (‘UNFPA’) and overseas aid including from Australia and the United Kingdom.76 In the initial phases of designing the census, Rohingyas feared they would be wrongly registered as ‘Bengali’ which, in the context of Myanmar’s citizenship rules denotes foreignness. Rohingya protests and other forms of activism, particularly in the camps for Internally Displaced Persons (‘IDPs’) in Rakhine State, drew international attention to re-categorisation as a form of state violence linked to citizenship stripping. Some proposals were put forward in census discussions to include an alternative category of ‘other’ under which Rohingyas could register. This was also not acceptable for many Rohingyas who understood that ‘other’ also designated them as different from ethnic groups that were considered by the state to belong to Myanmar. Myanmar went against the advice of their international technical advisors in refusing to allow Rohingya to self-identify. Collective Rohingya refusals to take part in the census followed. As a result, a large proportion of Rohingyas were not recorded on the national census.77 On the one hand, this collective refusal was important in drawing domestic and international attention to both the role of Myanmar state authorities in denying Rohingya citizenship and identity, and the role of international donors and organisations in legitimising these forms of bureaucratic and symbolic violence through the provision of technical and financial support for Myanmar’s census. It highlighted the need for international organisations and governments to put more pressure on the Myanmar government in the future including through funding structures. On the other hand, it also illustrated the limits of resistance strategies for those with little influence in national and subnational politics. Not being included in national statistics can result in being excluded from national-level development projects and welfare interventions. It can also further undermine claims to belong to the country, as Rohingya historians and activists found regarding the 1973 census in which they were not included. 78 Additionally, Buddhist Rakhine groups with ‘full-citizenship’ counter-protested against the inclusion of the term Rohingya in the census. These protests ultimately had greater influence on census practices at the national level.79 A further example of Rohingya collective refusal relates to NVCs which were issued to Rohingya in Myanmar from 2015 onwards. NVCs, which replaced the Temporary Registration Cards or ‘white cards’ previously held by Rohingya, identified the bearers as foreigners who needed to apply for citizenship.80 Between 2016 and 2018, many Rohingya collectively refused to accept NVCs and refused to participate in the data collection processes associated with them. 81 Consequently, with their ‘white cards’ invalidated, they had to function without an individual ID and were thus unable to apply for travel permits and the whole range of licenses needed for work. Multiple methods were used by civil and military authorities to force people to accept NVCs, including threats, arrests, physical abuse, denial of basic services and denial of birth registration. At the time, 76 77 78 79 80 81 Ferguson (n 24) 1–28. ICGG, Counting Costs(n 75) 24. Islam (n 47). ICG, Counting Costs (n 75). Brinham, Looking Beyond Invisibility (n 39); Brinham, Citizenship and Genocide Cards (n 4). See generally, Brinham, Citizenship and Genocide Cards (n 4) and more specifically ch 7 ‘“Genocide Cards”: ID’s Registration, and the Phases of the Rohingya Genocide’. 20