‘Diagnosing’ Statelessness B State Illegibility through Documentary Practices State illegibility in relation to documentary practices takes various forms. The first form manifests as uneven production of evidence by the state. Nida’s two identities, and her later deprivation of both, are case in point. This kind of incident is neither new nor unique to Nida; documentary errors and uneven registration practices by the Thai state are well-known. What is interesting is that despite this knowledge, state agents and those mobilising for rights of stateless persons alike, still insist on viewing legal documents as real and complete. The error in her identity document was normalised as acceptable and consequently was dismissed without much consideration of the possible psychological harms inflicted upon individuals by the delivery of misinformation, or lack of sufficient explanation. Failure to acknowledge unevenness in the state’s own bureaucratic practice and insistence on perceiving legal documents as objectively-produced evidence are not only a form of state illegibility but also a form of subtle violence, as it ignores the lived experience of stateless persons, who are left to find a solution for the situation they end up in, without acknowledging how they end up there. The second form, as mentioned previously, is the fragility of documents. For stateless persons, legal documents are fragile and unstable; they can be presented, accepted and approved but can also be overturned, taken away and removed at any time. A document may be valid today but it may cease to hold any meaning tomorrow, like in Nida’s case and the citizenship of the villagers in the first ethnographic account. Alternatively, they could hold no meaning at all despite being issued by the Thai state. In the case of the Hmong family, although the letters and some of the identification cards in their possession were issued by the Thai state, these documents are not considered qualifying evidence for a citizenship application because they were not a birth certificate, a house registration or an identification card containing a 13-digit-number. Even if an official wants to believe their story, they cannot justify granting them citizenship through a normal and standardised channel. The third form is linked with stereotyping practice. As noted by Flaim, ‘no matter how strong the “evidence” to a citizenship claim may be, citizenship conferral ultimately requires the conferral of belief’. 104 Despite the guidelines and flowcharts, the interpretation of evidence also rests on state agents’ consideration and willingness to believe. As seen in the first account, a Thai identity card when acquired by a highlander is still met with suspicion as to whether such acquisition is ‘truthful’. Assessment of evidence, therefore, is not merely an objective activity, but one that is at risk of stemming from the practice of stereotyping a group. Because stereotyping also depends on an individual’s perception of the ‘Other’, it is unpredictable and is one manifestation of state illegibility. Finally, while the international legal frameworks state that a right to a nationality is a basic human right, 105 the structure of evidentiary procedures and local practices can present obstacles to stateless persons in achieving that right. The authority invested in village headmen as customary focal points in the 104 Flaim (n 14) 148. 105 See, eg, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948); Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990). See also ‘Right to a Nationality and Statelessness’ Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (Web Page) <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/Nationality.aspx>. 235