where a Bidoon is denied the right to return to Kuwait, and is arbitrarily denied re-entry, he cannot be considered at real risk of persecution under the Refugee Convention because ‘if the country of origin refuses to admit or accept the return of the refugee claimant, the fear of being persecuted is similarly not well-founded in that country’.244 This determination was subsequently rejected for its lack of critical analysis concerning the discriminatory treatment of Bidoons in Kuwait,245 and the RSAA has since confirmed the importance of assessing persecutory treatment in the (hypothetical) event of return (see section 4.2). In Ireland, the High Court, considered both the purposive approach adopted by Pill LJ in Revenko and the literal approach adopted by Katz J in Savvin, to be appropriate since both approaches led to the same conclusion: a stateless person who is unable to return to the country of his former habitual residence, is not, by reason of those facts alone, a refugee within the meaning of Article 1A(2); he or she needs to show a present well-founded fear of persecution (for instance, based on lack of nationality) on a Convention ground.246 In this case, the High Court granted leave to bring judicial review on the ground that the reason the applicant was outside Kuwait was because he had been refused entry for a Convention reason, and this refusal itself may amount to ‘persecution’. Finally, the courts in the United States also preclude the mere condition of being stateless (with ‘no nationality’) as a basis for refugee status.247 In sum, state practice is consistent on this point: a stateless person who is unable to return to his or her country of former habitual residence due to practical obstacles is not, by reasons of those facts alone, a refugee within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention. This is consistent with modern doctrine according to which not all stateless persons are refugees; the implication being that the protection needs of stateless non-refugees should be determined under relevant legal provisions relating to statelessness. This jurisprudence further shows that courts consider issues of nationality to be part of the persecution assessment, and that consideration of how the person came to be stateless (e.g., for discriminatory reasons) is relevant. Thus, in a number of cases, where a person had been New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority (RSAA) chaired by Mr R Haines QC, Appeal No. 72635/01 of 6 September 2002, para.149, [2003] INLR 629. See also, NZ RSAA again chaired by Mr R Haines QC, Appeal No. 1/92, 30 April 1992, in the case of a stateless Palestinian from Morocco. For a similar Australian ruling, see RRTA Appeal No. 0808284 discussed above. Note that this view is shared by James C. Hathaway in The Law of Refugee Status, Butterworths, 1991, at p.62. 245 NZ RSAA, Appeal No. 74467 of 1 September 2004, para.81. 246 A.A.A.A.D. v Refugee Appeals Tribunal and the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2009] IEHC 326. The case involved a Bidoon from Kuwait. Kuwait became fully independent in 1961, following 41 years of British protectorate. A system of individual registration, initiated under British rules, resulted in the non-registration of a large number of people, with their descendants. Those who did not possess a nationality were known as Kuwaiti Bidoons (or bedoon or bidun, meaning ‘the without’); in Arabic, they are bidun jinsiya (without nationality or without citizenship). 247 Maksimova v. Holder, 361 F. Appendix 690, 693 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating that statelessness is not grounds for asylum, and that a ‘stateless applicant must show the same well-founded fear of persecution as an applicant with a nationality’; see also Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 214 (3rd Cir. 2003). 244 43