2021 Statelessness & Citizenship Review 3(1) interpretation of this issue means that some Palestinians may be denied protection and left in limbo, without any status. They would be unable to leave the country in which they sought asylum if, at the time of status determination, their circumstances were such that they cannot return to any part of UNRWA’s area of operation. In the present case, as noted, the applicant’s departure from Lebanon should not be considered to have been voluntary. With different facts, there could be a different result. A better approach would be for decision-makers to consider whether the applicant, at the time of refugee status determination, could or could not access UNRWA assistance that would allow them to live in safety and dignity, in any field of UNRWA operations. If they could not, for reasons beyond their control, then UNRWA assistance should be considered to have ceased, triggering the inclusion clause of art 1D and automatic acknowledgement as a refugee. As UNHCR emphasises, ‘Palestinian refugees who fall within the scope of Article 1D are persons whom the international community has already recognised as refugees’.27 The aim of the inclusion clause is to maintain their protection. Where an applicant left an UNRWA field of operation voluntarily but later is unable to return to any UNRWA area for reasons beyond their control, UNRWA protection or assistance has ceased.28 It would have been helpful if the Court had elucidated the concept of dignity and expanded on its observation that XT could not obtain a residence permit in Lebanon. Palestinians often have no permanent residence — only ‘tolerated stay’ or temporary permission based on employment, in UNRWA’s area of operation and throughout the Middle East and North Africa. In some places, they face significant restrictions on their activities and access to official procedures. In such situations, their status remains precarious, and they should not be considered to be living in that place in safety and dignity for as long as is ‘necessary’.29 The Court does not clarify what it means to live in dignity, and this may be the subject of future litigation. ARTICLE 1D’S RECENT APPLICATION IN DOMESTIC JURISDICTIONS — BRIEF EXAMPLES In some countries, recent jurisprudence has generally followed the El Kott approach, but with varying results. In 2020, in case number NL20.6600,30 an Amsterdam District Court found that UNRWA could not meet the needs of the appellant and his family in Gaza, and UNRWA assistance had ceased for reasons beyond the applicant’s control; therefore, he should be granted refugee status. Similarly, a 2019 judgment of the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal, AE (Lebanon),31 found that the appellant was a refugee pursuant to art 1D. The Tribunal considered the appellant’s serious medical conditions and UNWRA’S inability to fund the required medical treatment or provide financial support sufficient to prevent ‘abject poverty’.32 27 28 29 30 31 32 ibid [13]. ibid [20]. Alheto (n 15) [143]. M F Wijngaarden v Secretary of State for Justice and Security, Rechtbank Den Haag [The Hague District Court], NL20.6600, 24 August 2020. AE (Lebanon) [2019] NZIPT 801588. ibid [81]. 110