consent or request of the person concerned, and as such, broadly encompasses all acts of State-sponsored denaturalisation.30 18. The reference to “arbitrary” is more complex, but it does have particular meaning in international law.31 As the International Court of Justice has explained, arbitrariness and unlawfulness are not equivalent concepts. Arbitrariness is “not so much something opposed to a rule of law, as something opposed to the rule of law … it is a wilful disregard of due process of law, an act which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of judicial propriety”.32 In the human rights context, the standard aims to ensure that even ‘lawful’ interference with rights is consistent with the provisions, aims and objectives of the relevant law, and above all, is reasonable.33 Arbitrariness thus contains both substantive and procedural aspects. 19. The key aspects of arbitrariness in the context of the prohibition against the arbitrary deprivation of nationality can be characterised as follows: (1) The deprivation of nationality must conform to the law – both to its letter and its object (so as to avoid an outcome that is unjust, illegitimate or unpredictable).34 This includes the rules regarding deprivations rendering a person stateless, where the 1961 Convention is applicable,35 or where statelessness is independently relevant to the arbitrariness assessment.36 (2) The deprivation must serve a legitimate purpose that is consistent with international law and must be proportionate to the interest that the State seeks to protect.37 This means, for example, that, as set out by the International Law Commission, the State is not justified in depriving a person of nationality for the sole purpose of expelling ‘Arbitrary deprivation of nationality: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/34, 26 January 2009, para. 49. 30 It has been described as a general principle of international law: see J. Stone. ‘Arbitrariness, the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, and the International Law of Investment’ (2012) 25(1) Leiden Journal of International Law, pp. 8587. 31 Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v Italy) [1989] ICJ Rep. 15, para. 128 (emphasis added). This lack of equivalence between unlawfulness and arbitrariness was specifically recognised in the drafting history of Article 15(2) of the UDHR: the majority of State representatives took the view that a person could neither be deprived of nationality in breach of existing laws, nor on the basis of laws that operated arbitrarily: I. Ziemele and G. Schram, ‘Article 15’ in. A. Eide, G. Alfredson (eds), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement (1999), pp. 302-303. 32 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘CCPR General Comment No. 16: The right to respect of privacy, family, home and correspondence, and protection of honour and reputation (Article 17)’ (1988), para. 4. 33 Ibid; ‘Human Rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc. A/HRC/13/34, 14 December 2009, paras 24-25. See, e.g., Ivcher Bronstein v Peru, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Judgment, 6 February 2001, Ser. C, No. 74, para. 95. 34 See, e.g., 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Article 8(1). As noted at footnote 18 above, deprivation resulting in statelessness is permitted under the 1961 Convention in certain limited circumstances. 35 See, e.g., Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award (Civilian Claims – Eritrea’s Claims 15, 16, 23 and 2732) (2004) 26 UNRIAA 195, paras 60, 62, where statelessness was a factor relevant to the Commission’s analysis. 36 ‘Arbitrary deprivation of nationality: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/34, 26 January 2009, para. 49; ‘Human Rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc. A/HRC/13/34, 14 December 2009, para. 25. 37 7