e. Principle 9 (further human rights, humanitarian and refugee law obligations and standards), and f. Principle 10 (deprivation by proxy and proxy measures). 27. Principle 4.2 recognises that some States do, “in exception to this basic rule, provide for the deprivation of nationality for the purpose of safeguarding national security . Such State conduct may even be based on a particular interpretation of treaty obligations. There is an international treaty provision for example, which allows for an exception to the general prohibition of deprivation of nationality: if a person has conducted themselves in a manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State.40 Some states interpret this as synonymous with national security. Applying general norms of interpretation, Principle . . goes on to articulate that “the exercise of this exception should be interpreted and applied narrowly . International law continues to evolve, and as set out above, must be applied in whole, without prejudice. As such, the aforementioned exception concerning conduct that is ‘seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State’ must be interpreted and applied narrowly. 28. In accordance with the principle of non-regression and the continuity of obligations under international human rights law,41 States should not implement new laws or enter into new treaty provisions which expand state power to deprive a person of nationality for the purpose of safeguarding national security. Furthermore, it would be good practice for States to review any existing treaty or national legal provisions which, in exception to this Basic Rule, are interpreted as allowing the deprivation of nationality for the purpose of safeguarding national security, in order to ensure full compliance with international law. Such a process of review and amendment would be in line with the principle of non-regression and the continuity of obligations under international human rights law. 29. Principle 4.2 also states that the narrow interpretation and implementation of such exceptions should result in nationality deprivation “only in situations in which it has been determined by a lawful conviction that meets international fair trial standards, that the person has conducted themselves in a manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the state. This provision relates to the right to a fair trial (Principle 8) as well as the prohibition of arbitrariness (Principle 7). It also directly draws on language from Article 8(3) of the 1961 Convention.42 30. Further, the legal provisions that set out deprivation powers should not be construed expansively or applied by analogy, so that they are applied in a context which is not manifestly covered by the wording of the provision. 31. As set out in Principle . , “the exercise of this narrow exception to deprive a person of nationality is further limited by other standards of international law . The relevant Commentary text below elaborates on each of these standards. 40 Art. 8(3)(a)(ii) 1961 Convention. Human Rights Committee ,‘General Comment No. : Continuity of Obligations’ CCPR C Rev. Add. Rev. . 42 For a more detailed analysis of the relevance and application of this clause, see the commentary on Principle 5 on the avoidance of statelessness. 41 30