sort. ... [T]he Commission believes that this penalty [is] anachronistic, outlandish and legally unjustifiable .”37 23. The Basic Rule distils the Principles down to one succinct statement (Principle 4.1), followed by an elaboration on the limitations that apply to any exceptions to this rule (Principles 4.2 and 4.3), as well as the application of the rule to proxy measures (Principle 4.4). It does so by synthesising different international law standards and relating them to each other. The Basic Rule draws on the principle of harmonization: “a generally accepted principle that when several norms bear on a single issue, they should, to the extent possible, be interpreted so as to give rise to a single set of compatible obligations .38 The Principles encourage a holistic application of international law. 24. In taking this holistic approach, the highest protective standard must always apply. This is because international human rights law is obligatory and not aspirational, setting out a floor or minimum standards to be adhered to, and States are obligated to give effect to their treaty obligations and international customary obligations in good faith (pacta sunt servanda).39 If there is inconsistency among different treaties or standards, it is the highest protective standard that should serve as this ‘floor’. This is a standard rule of interpretation in the Principles themselves see Principle . . on interpretation): “In all circumstances, the Principles should be interpreted in accordance with international human rights law and standards, applying the most favourable provision of protection”. This is the inevitable consequence of applying overlapping law and standards which are complementary: that which is most protective of the individual’s right to a nationality or a composite of individual human rights interests) will remain applicable. 25. A holistic and purposive analysis and application of international law standards, led the experts involved in drafting the Principles to extract the norm that “states shall not deprive persons of nationality for the purpose of safeguarding national security Principle . . Though there is no explicit treaty body or other source, which articulates this norm in the clear terms set out in the Principles, this does not mean that the Principle is establishing a new norm. Rather, the rule simply integrates the cumulative import of relevant international law standards, putting them together and applying them to the context of citizenship deprivation for the (purported) purpose of safeguarding national security. 26. To distil the international law underpinnings of the Basic Rule, it is necessary to refer to the commentary to the other Principles as follows: a. b. c. d. Principle 5 (the avoidance of statelessness), Principle 6 (the prohibition of discrimination), Principle 7 (the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality), Principle 8 (the rights to fair trial, effective remedy and reparation), 37 Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile, IACHR OEA/Ser/L/V/II.40, Doc 10, 11 February 1977, at. 80-1. ILC, ‘Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Part Two, ; UN Doc A , para 251. 39 Art 26 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. : The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant’ CCPR C Rev. Add. , para . 38 29