Citizenship Stripping in Myanmar as Lawfare the Union of Myanmar (‘NUG’) pledged that the 1982 Law would be repealed with the success of the Spring Revolution and the removal of the SAC.6 In this commentary, I contextualise the three orders of denationalisation against the backdrop of the ongoing Spring Revolution against the military junta and the latter’s brutal suppression of the former. I argue that the SAC only impulsively and arbitrarily used citizenship stripping or revocation as part of its package of warfare against the revolution. THE 1982 LAW AND THE PROVISION FOR DENATIONALISATION The 1982 Law was originally written during the rule of the xenophobic Burma Socialist Programme Party regime (1974–88). The law divides Myanmar citizenry into a ‘native’ component, capturing those who had settled in the country before British colonisation (prior to 1823), and a non-native, immigrant component, concerning those who migrated to colonial Burma, where they later settled permanently. By according different rights to two classes of citizens, the law effectively elevates the status of citizens of ‘native’ ancestry above the status of citizens of immigrant ancestry.7 Why did the SAC use the pro-native 1982 Law, and s 16 in particular, in suppressing alleged ‘terrorism’ against its rule? The short answer is because this section contains the only provision in the Myanmar legal corpus that permits denationalisation of citizens. Myanmar citizenship may only be revoked under one of two conditions: where the individual leaves Myanmar permanently and/or where the individual acquires citizenship and identity documentation, such as a national ID or passport, of a foreign country. 8 The three SAC orders of denationalisation stated that all of the 33 people left Myanmar, thus satisfying the condition as required in the 1982 Law. The 1982 Law was in effect when dissidents, activists and politicians fled Myanmar in search of refuge in neighbouring countries9 after the military took power in September 1988 in the aftermath of popular protests against the oneparty socialist regime. Although, while in power, the military junta used a variety of tools to repress the opposition, they never used the denationalisation provision in the 1982 Law.10 The military’s decision in March and April 2022 is therefore unprecedented. This, however, was not the first attempt to denationalise or deprive Myanmar Spring revolutionaries and opposition politicians of Myanmar identity documentation. In 2021, the Embassy of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 6 See eg, Zin Mar Aung (Facebook, 5 March 2022) <https://www.facebook.com/100011819040715/posts/1239702309767059/>, archived at <https://perma.cc/P8Y6-K74H>; Wai Mar Tun, ‘နင ို င ် သ ံ ားအဖြစ်ရပ်စမ ဲ ှု လအခွငအ ် ကရားချ ားကြ 7 8 9 10 ်ရ ကရ ်က င်ား ကေြန် [Critics: Denationalisation is Human Rights Violation]’, Radio Free Asia (Burmese) (Blog Post, 7 March 2022) <https://www.rfa.org/ burmese/program_2/myanmar-citizenship-law03072022164332.html>, archived at <https://perma.cc/2QMN-3QXB>; Ministry of Justice (Facebook, 4 April 2022) <https://www.facebook.com/107793768252630/posts/173910538307619/>, archived at <https://perma.cc/J2BP-4264>. Nyi Nyi Kyaw, ‘Alienation, Discrimination, and Securitization: Legal Personhood and Cultural Personhood of Muslims in Myanmar’ (2015) 13(4) Review of Faith & International Affairs 50. Burma Citizenship Law 1982, s 16 (Burma). Bertil Lintner, Outrage: Burma’s Struggle for Democracy (Review Publishing Company, 1989) 196–215. Wai Mar Tun (n 6). 281