Chapter 2 The Right to Nationality and Judgment TC/0168/13 of the Constitutional Court | 81 Court also mentioned the arguments developed by the Inter-American Court. 182 The Constitutional Court made the following comments about the Inter-American Court’s judgment: a) the Court’s “erroneous interpretation” of the categories of “foreigners in transit” and “transient foreigners”; b) the margin of discretion in determining who “foreigners in transit” are, and c) the possibility that Haitians in transit and their descendants could become stateless. 177. The Constitutional Court criticized the criteria established by the Inter-American Court in the case of Yean and Bosico. In that case, the Inter-American Court, citing Section V of Regulation of Migration of the Dominican Republic No. 279 of May 12, 1939, in force when the request for late registration of birth of the victims in the case was made, held that this rule was clear in stating that the transient foreigner has the purpose of passing through the territory, for which a time limit of no more than ten days is set. In more detail, the Court noted that, to consider a person as a transient or in transit, regardless of the classification used, the State must respect a reasonable time limit, and be consistent with the fact that a foreigner who develops connections a State cannot be equated to a transient or a person in transit. 183 178. Furthermore, inasmuch as the Inter-American Court acknowledges that “[t]he determination of who has a right to be a citizen continues to fall within a State’s domestic jurisdiction” 184 and because the “question of nationality continues to be a particularly sensitive one for [the Dominican Republic],” the Constitutional Court held that the concept of “margin of discretion” could be used to determine the meaning and scope of the notion of “foreigners in transit.” 179. As for the Inter-American Court’s observation to the effect that the “authority of the States [to determine who has a right to be a national] is limited […] by their obligation to prevent, avoid and reduce statelessness,” 185 the Constitutional Court pointed out that the refusal […] to grant nationality to the children of foreigners in transit does not lead to statelessness, because the 1983 Haitian Constitution […] expressly provides […] that all persons born abroad to a Haitian father and mother shall obtain Haitian nationality by birth.” 180. Based on the above-mentioned arguments, the Constitutional Court determined that because Juliana’s parents were Haitian workers who came to the Dominican Republic as temporary day workers under the 1939 Modus Operandi agreement with the Republic of Haiti, her parents had to be regarded as “temporary day workers” (one of the groups of non-immigrant foreign workers) and, therefore, “foreigners in transit”. It also held that Juliana Deguis had failed to prove that at least one of her parents had legal residency in the Dominican Republic either at the time of her birth or thereafter. 182 183 184 185 I/A Court H.R., Case of Yean and Bosico Girls v. Dominican Republic. Judgment of September 8, 2005. Series C, No. 130. I/A Court H.R., Case of Yean and Bosico Girls v. Dominican Republic. Judgment of September 8, 2005. Series C, No. 130, para. 157 Ibid., para. 140. Ibid., para. 140. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights | IACHR