undermine the fundamental aim and principle of responsibility sharing. 90 There is no basis in international law for confining protection obligations to a particular timeframe or introducing any other temporal limit. Conclusion 56. In light of the above analysis, we conclude: 56.1. The CAA on its face differentiates in providing access to naturalisation on the basis of religion 56.2. The stated legitimate objective, namely, refugee protection, is not supported by the text of the CAA given that satisfaction of refugee criteria or any other factual assessment of protection needs is irrelevant to the benefit provided. 56.3. Even if facilitation of naturalisation of refugees were a legitimate objective, there is no empirical evidence to support the need for the differentiation in this case. 56.4. The other stated objectives of repatriating citizens of ‘undivided India’ and ‘minorities protection’ have also been found to be without support in this case. 56.5. The CAA is therefore both under and over inclusive in relation to the stated objective and thus not proportional. 56.6. The CAA is in violation of India’s obligations in relation to; 56.6.1. Article 26 of the ICCPR 56.6.2. The prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of nationality, now recognised as a fundamental norm of international law. 90 See Global Compact on Refugees, GA Res 73/151, UN Doc A/RES/73/151 (10 January 2019, adopted on 17 December 2018). 18