In 1998, a war broke out between the two countries. Many Eritreans residing in Ethiopian were arrested and expelled. In 1999, the Ethiopian government declared that all Eritreans who had voted in the 1991 Eritrean independence referendum had assumed Eritrean citizenship and were no longer Ethiopian nationals. These Eritreans were thus required to register for foreigner residence permits (ibid., 328). In 2000, the Eritrean government declared that individuals of Ethiopian descent living in Eritrea who had not sought nationality by 1998 would be considered foreigners. In 2004, an independent commission formed following the 1998 war declared that all who had voted in the independence referendum were entitled to dual Eritrean and Ethiopian nationality (ibid., 331). Most people who were rendered stateless by past Ethiopian policies had their nationality restored. However, many individuals of mixed Ethiopian and Eritrean parentage found it impossible to gain either nationality, often due to administrative challenges (Southwick 2009). Some Ethiopian- and Eritrean-born individuals of mixed parentage remain stateless (ibid.). In 2011, the Sudanese government passed a law stripping Sudanese citizenship from those acquiring South Sudanese citizenship. This placed many individuals from South Sudanese ethnic groups residing in the Republic of Sudan at risk of statelessness. The Republic of Sudan does not require confirmation of citizenship from South Sudan and lacks a clear documentation requirement of South Sudanese citizenship, which makes the process of denationalization arbitrary (Sanderson 2014, 87-88). Many persons born in South Sudan are also potentially stateless or potentially at risk of statelessness. Since South Sudan’s independence from the Republic of Sudan, individuals have been required to secure certificates that confirm their South Sudanese nationality. If they do not, the South Sudanese government does not consider them citizens. Many people have to travel to Juba, South Sudan’s capital, to confirm their citizenship (UNHCR 2017b, 3). Poor people and persons living in remote areas – for whom this trip is difficult—face significant obstacles to citizenship. Moreover, members of nomadic groups and populations near borders may have difficulty proving their right to nationality (ibid., 32-33). In addition, in order to apply for a nationality certificate, individuals must provide birth certificates. The South Sudanese government has little capacity to register births, placing many children at risk of statelessness (ibid., 3). Sudanese-born individuals of South Sudanese descent who arrived in the United States in or after 2011 are potentially stateless or potentially at risk of statelessness. All South Sudanese who arrived in or after 2011 are potentially stateless or potentially at risk of statelessness. Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge, ethnic Hutu and Tutsi speakers of Kinyarwanda from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), are potentially stateless or potentially at risk of stateless. These groups arrived in the DRC in several waves. The earliest arrivals were Tutsi herders who migrated from Rwanda and Burundi in the 18th and 19th centuries. Their descendants are now known as the Banyamulenge. Other Kinyarwanda speakers were brought to the DRC by Belgian colonial authorities to work in mines and coffee plantations before the country’s independence (Manby 2015, 275). Subsequent waves mostly consisted of economic migrants and refugees fleeing ethnic violence in Rwanda and Burundi in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1990s. The Rwandan 35