citizenship law, particularly in the cases examined in this paper. As such, first, I briefly juxtapose relevant
theories of citizenship with those of statelessness, conveying a broader understanding of the production
of statelessness on the whole. After, I examine a range of examples of contemporary citizenship laws,
tracing their roots historically and demonstrating how particular clauses within those laws have
produced various forms of statelessness today. In combination with the earlier section, this goes to
show the linkages of citizenship law exclusion clauses with patterns of migration and rule. Migration
fundamentally challenges the sedentarist biases which underly citizenship as an instrument of reifying the
modern state system, and, as such, the two are often studied together (Anzaldúa, 1987; De Genova,
2002; Joppke and Morawska, 2003; Pailey, 2016; Pailey, 2017; Kymlicka and Norman, 1994; Sassen, 2003;
Whitaker, 2011; Dirlik, 2003; Yuval‐Davis, 2007; Sassen, 1996; Barry, 2006; Beaman, 2017; Coutin, 2000;
Bloemraad, 2004; Bosniak, 2000; Bosworth, 2014). This section continues the strand of thought present
in those literatures, while also bringing in literatures of statelessness.
A Note on ‘Citizenship’ and ‘Statelessness’
At its core, citizenship is about political belonging (Lazar, 2013). T.H. Marshall’s (1950) definition
of citizenship is perhaps the starting point for most major work on citizenship, particularly in a ‘nationstate’ sense of the word, which is the relevant variant here. He wrote: “Citizenship is a status bestowed
on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to
the rights and duties with which the status is endowed” (1950: 253). His definition is rooted in liberal
philosophy, and his definition is one of ‘liberal citizenship’. However, liberalism has always demanded,
paradoxically, simultaneous equality and inequality (Losurdo and Elliott, 2011). As such, the theoretically
‘universalizing’ citizenship which arose from those revolutions was bounded and fraught with exclusion
clauses, to the point that the ‘equality’ and ‘full membership’ Marshall refers to were established only
between white, male, property owners, while all others were disincluded to varying degrees.
Paradoxical liberalism remains engrained in many contemporary societies: Europe, and the
formation of the European Union, are a quintessential example. Dace Dzenovska (2018) describes the
“paradox of Europeanness—that is, the simultaneous demand for inclusion and exclusion, openness and
closure, transcendence and erection of borders” (11). What emerges is professed inclusion for an
expressedly exclusive group. These same dynamics apply to many citizenship policies and practices
worldwide, and broadly to the entire institution of liberal citizenship. The institutions in Southeast Asia,
which are largely built upon traditional, European, liberal foundations, carry the same exclusivities
(Mamdani, 2012; Mamdani, 1996). Exclusivity is written into the laws of citizenship itself. It is within
these ‘exclusion clauses’ that statelessness is actively produced—not indiscriminately, but targeting
specific types of individual. Statelessness is not an unintentional by-product of citizenship, nor is it
16