Introduction 7 previous decade, which is explored in this book, was known as the ‘transition’ period in which the Military leadership was expected to steadily relinquish political power towards more democratic forms of governance. International engagement with Myanmar during this period was characterised by strategic and ‘quiet’ forms of diplomacy as well as pragmatic humanitarianism often at the expense of human rights approaches (Mahony 2018; Rosenthal 2019). The coup and events that followed saw a resumption of sanctions, disengagement, divestment, and aid delivery through cross-border opposition groups rather than the institutions associated with the Myanmar military (Martin 2023). Further, attitudes towards Rohingya changed, with many of those in the movements resisting military rule offering words of support and acknowledgement to Rohingya refugees (Loong 2023). Israel’s ongoing assault on Gaza since October 2023 has also thrust the issue of statelessness and statehood in the context of genocide into the international public consciousness. With connections made between the experiences of Palestinians and Rohingya, international approaches to statehood and citizenship are likely to shift further. Hopefully, this research as a space of reflection on a period following mass state-perpetrated violence can contribute to the increasing exchanges of knowledge between those that work to prevent and understand state criminality, and the statelessness field. The production of statelessness as state crime The thread running through this research project is the role of Rohingya survivors in influencing understandings of how statelessness is produced, moving understandings of their statelessness from an issue of state oversight or neglect to one involving the criminal behaviour of the state. International discourses and approaches to Rohingya statelessness over the years have reflected two broader issues. The first issue is how the role of the Myanmar state in the violence perpetrated against Rohingya in Myanmar was framed internationally—whether the situation was understood as one of communal violence and conflict or one of state-led persecution and genocide. The second issue is how citizenship was framed globally as either an area reserved for state discretion or constrained by international law. How far states can determine and limit their own membership through citizenship laws and practices, and how far international law should be able to limit state power in this regard is a long-standing debate (Siegelberg 2020). In theory, three areas of international law limit state power regarding citizenship: the prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of citizenship, the state duty to provide safeguards against statelessness, and the prohibition against discrimination (Open Society Justice Initiative 2005).9 Whilst, in practice, many states disregard these limitations, there have been increasing attempts to strengthen human rights norms relating to citizenship (Goldston 2006; Weissbrodt and Collins 2006; Spiro 2011; Foster and Lambert 2016). This conflict or fault line between state sovereignty and human rights law has