52 By-passing state power and neutralising state bureaucracies statelessness and its impacts (UNHCR 2017; Bloom, Manby et al. 2019; UN Sustainable Development Group 2019). Amongst all the talk of invisibility, Rohingya narratives throughout this research described not their invisibility in Myanmar but their hypervisibility to state surveillance systems (Brinham 2019, 2019). The notions of an archetypal stateless person that is ‘invisible’ to state and to international agencies have over decades been consolidated leading to policy approaches that engage with rather than challenge the state and accordingly by-pass peoples’ experiences of targeted state campaigns of exclusion and persecution. Stateless experiences are thus homogenised as invisibility.34 ‘The stateless person’ as an object of national and global governances then produces recommendations of more state registration and more identification documents, with little assessment of the harm this may produce, as I will explore throughout the rest of this thesis (Brinham 2019; Manby 2021). By-passing crimes against the group This section provides context to Rohingya framings of the production of statelessness as part of a genocidal process that destroys group identity, as explored in Chapters 7 and 8. In doing so, it considers the links between citizenship and identity in statelessness literature. In Lemkin’s original conception of genocide, a term which he coined before its incorporation into international law (Frieze and Lemkin 2013; Siegelberg 2013), he referred to ‘the destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed’ as a central component of genocide and group destruction’ (Lemkin 1944). By this, he meant the systematic erasure of ethnic, religious, or other ‘national groups’ from the broader citizenship body by dominant groups controlling the state. Lemkin’s long struggle to have genocide recognised as an international crime in part resulted from his approach of focusing on crimes perpetrated against the group rather than the individual. The individual within international law had gained prominence over groups in the WWII and post-WWII years (Frieze and Lemkin 2013; Siegelberg 2013; Sands 2016). He argued that a crime against the group is fundamentally different from a crime against the individual (Lemkin 1944). This significance of group destruction over individual victimhood was similarly asserted in Rohingya narratives of genocide and identity destruction as I will explore in Chapter 8. In this section, I argue that the increasing prominence given to individual citizenship status has diverted policy approaches away from experiences of group destruction. Citizenship: from identity to state identification In the past notions of group, membership and identity were understood to be integral to citizenship and accordingly approaches to resolving statelessness focused on minority groups. In the post-WWII human rights framework, these gave way to more individualistic notions of citizenship and approaches