2022 Statelessness & Citizenship Review 4(2) relationship between nationality and citizenship.14 For them, nationality as citizenship can, for the most part, be used interchangeably. In this article, I follow their approach. However, it is not clear whether the concept of statelessness is meant to address this connection, as the denial of citizenship rights does not render someone stateless under the current legal framework. In law, nationality can function independently of citizenship and vice versa.15 Georg Schwarzenberger, for instance, contends that ‘[f]or the purposes of his own municipal law, a [state] may deny to groups of inhabitants … all or most rights of citizenship, yet still consider himself entitled to protect them in relation to other subjects of international law’.16 Referring to Sigismund Gargas’ early enquiry, The Stateless, in 1928, Paul Weis makes the same point. He argues that ‘[c]onceptually and linguistically, the terms “nationality” and “citizenship” emphasize two different aspects of the same notion: State membership. “Nationality” stresses the international, “citizenship” the national, municipal, aspect’.17 Hence, the second understanding of nationality takes individuals to have a position in international law through their attachment to their country of nationality.18 As seen in the previous paragraph, the concept of statelessness has historically described this lack of attachment. More precisely, the stateless are either de jure or de facto without such a position in international law. Yet, even if someone possesses a nationality and thereby, a position, it has not been clear what that entails. In the following Part, I examine the most recent research and argue that ordinary individuals must be seen as objects of international law. 1 Object Versus Subject Theory Tracing back to the 18th century and Emer de Vattel’s work, The Law of Nations,19 the so-called object theory holds that individuals, unlike states, cannot be subjects of international law. The theory instead claims that they are mere objects, comparable to ships and territory,20 ostensibly worthy of protection by the country of nationality against other countries.21 The object theory is based on the following disjunctive syllogism: Binary premise: Individuals must either be a subject or an object of international law. Elimination premise: Individuals cannot be a subject of international law. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Alice Edwards, ‘The Meaning of Nationality in International Law in an Era of Human Rights: Procedural and Substantive Aspects’ in Alice Edwards and Laura van Waas (eds), Nationality and Statelessness under International Law (Cambridge University Press 2014) 14. Therefore, some states, such as Honduras, Bolivia, Mexico and Latvia, clearly distinguish between nationality and citizenship: Delia Rudan, ‘Nationality and Political Rights’, in Serena Forlati and Alessandra Annoni (eds), The Changing Role of Nationality in International Law (Routledge, 1st edn, 2013) 117, 117. Georg Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law (Professional Books Ltd, 6th edn, 1976) 141–42. Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law (Brill 1979) 4–5. L Oppenheim, International Law — A Treatise (Longmans and Green, 2nd Edn, 1912) vol 1, 366. Kate Parlett, The Individual in the International Legal System: Continuity and Change in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2011) 10. George Manner, ‘The Object Theory of the Individual in International Law’ (1952) 46 American Journal of International Law 428, 429. ibid 428–29. 240