34 Theoretical error, real-world problems example on race and on gender, so it stands to reason that these elements con tinue­ to­ motivate­ structurally­ entrenched­ injustices­ in­ contemporary­ liberal isms and societies based around them. This need not mean that Locke’s work and that of other liberals should be discarded, but that in using it and the work that builds upon it, we need to be aware of the blind spots of the authors. One such blind spot that still persists from these origins is found in the reality of unacknowledged noncitizenship. Contemporary developments Contemporary liberalism arose in the late twentieth century out of this tradition. It developed particularly after the First and Second World Wars and with a new perspective on the possibilities of what people can do to each other. Its authors, several of whom are based in the United States, were responding to a perceived need­to­apply­the­liberal­principles­of­the­past­to­find­a­just­way­forward­in­a­new­ and­ frightening­ world.­ As­ in­ the­ classic­ texts,­ justice­ internal­ to­ the­ State­ was­ initially still the primary concern though certainly not the only one. They inher ited the assumption of citizenship, which has largely remained unchallenged. Perhaps most paradigmatic amongst those contemporary liberals is John Rawls, who had himself experienced the changing realisation about the world, through military service in Asia (including seeing the aftermath of the Hiro shima bomb) and campus politics (including protests against the Viet Nam War), for example.24 His work presented a new sort of liberal framework, arising from and for mid-twentieth-century America. For Rawls and others there is a focus on relations within the citizenry, excluding noncitizens from the ranks of the vulnerable and excluded. He recognises that State borders are morally arbitrary, but holds that this does not render them meaningless, and seems to use this to legitimise their assumed prevalence.25 From behind an international veil of ignorance, Rawls believes that representatives of peoples would reach a consensus for duties only of mutual aid between ‘liberal and decent peoples’, and a duty of assistance between them and illiberal, not ‘decent’, peoples.26­ This­ makes­ it­ difficult­ to­ consider­ justice­ for­ those­ indi viduals already marginalised by, or not obviously attached to, a particular State or the system of States. This is not completely resolved when the theory is globalised. In his globalised version of a Rawlsian framework for example, Charles Beitz emphasises the 24 Daniele Botti, forthcoming; Iain King (2014) ‘Thinkers at War – John Rawls’, Military History Monthly. 25 John Rawls (1999) The Law of Peoples, Harvard University Press p. 252. 26 John Rawls proposes the ‘veil of ignorance’ as a thought experiment. He suggests that one way to­test­the­principles­ of­ justice­is­ to­ imagine­what­sort­ of­ principles­would­ be­ devised­ by­ indi viduals who know nothing of their position in society but who understand the basics of how a society functions. Rawls himself saw this as functioning on a State level, but neo-Rawlsians like Thomas Pogge and Charles Beitz have used the same device on a global level.