14 Noncitizenism noncitizenship). What this book does offer is a way in which to understand how people are in fact relating to States, providing an alternative to the hyphenated ‘non-citizenship’, as nothing more than a negation, based on the assumption that citizenship is the only possible mode of relating to a State. While more inclusive admission to full citizenship regimes is an important way to address many instances of activated noncitizenship, the problems associated with the non-recognition of (unhyphenated) noncitizenship cannot be adequately addressed in this way – neither theoretically nor practically. It is also not solved by adding yet more quasi-citizen statuses to an already long list. The human rights of everyone are, in theory at least, already legally protected, albeit not enforceably so, by existing treaties and conventions.15 This book argues for an explicit philosophical, social and political recognition of the rights of noncitizens qua noncitizens. These rights are based on three factors: a person’s humanity, her/is noncitizenvulnerability in relationship to a particular State or States, and the challenge that this raises for the relevant State(s) and the State system, including challenging its legitimacy. The noncitizenship presented here is a foundational relationship in its own right and the demand for its recognition is one of justice. Consider the more than 11 million irregular immigrants in the United States, for example.16 Irrespective of any citizen-approximating status, and separate from arguments for amnesties, I argue that irregular immigrants already have legitimate claims upon the US (in this case) for human recognition, and to enable them to meet their basic needs and develop their capabilities. The argument here is that these claims are not only humanitarian or ethical. They are also political and institutional, based on the individuals’ noncitizen relationships to the US. One could argue that the US never consented to their physical presence, indeed tried to block it, but this does not detract from the noncitizenship-based claims those individuals have against the US.17 These claims do not only derive from their presence, but also from the theoretical realities of State-creation and the policy realities of exclusion. This relationship may even be more deeply felt and so further ‘activated’ because of the decapacitation, exclusions and coercion of irregular immigrants, generating particular obligations towards them.18 This 15 David Weissbrodt (2008) The Human Rights of Non-Citizens, Oxford University Press. See also OHCHR (2006) The Rights of Non-citizens, United Nations. 16 The most recent official figure comes form a 2012 report for the US Department of Homeland Security, estimating 11,510,000 persons; Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina and Bryan Baker (2012) ‘Estimates off the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2011’, Department of Homeland Security, p. 4. Irregular migration is examined in more detail in Chapter 3. 17 Conversely, the argument might be made that the US has consented through the acceptance of these persons’ labour. Prima facie this was not acceptance by the State but by employers, though this can be contested, (e.g. see Christian Joppke (1998) ‘Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration’, pp. 266–293 in World Politics 50(2)). Whichever way, if there is consent, it only strengthens the argument here. 18 For example, see Jose Antonio Vargas (2011) ‘My Life as an Undocumented Immigrant’, The New York Times Magazine.