G.T.B. v. SPAIN JUDGMENT 2008). The notion of private life is not limited to an “inner circle” in which the individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and exclude the outside world (see Denisov, cited above, § 96). Article 8 secures to individuals a sphere within which they can freely pursue the development and fulfilment of their personality (see Brüggemann and Scheuten v. Germany, no. 6959/75, Commission decision of 19 May 1976, Decisions and Reports 5, p. 103, and A.-M.V. v. Finland, no. 53251/13, § 76, 23 March 2017). The notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of Article 8 (see Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28957/95, § 90, ECHR 2002-VI, and Jivan v. Romania, no. 62250/19, § 30, 8 February 2022). The Court has generally acknowledged the importance of privacy and the values to which it relates, including psychological well-being and dignity (see Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, no. 41288/15, § 117, 14 January 2020), personality development (see Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, § 95, ECHR 2012), physical and psychological integrity (see Söderman v. Sweden [GC], no. 5786/08, § 80, ECHR 2013, and Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], nos. 47621/13 and 5 others, § 261, 8 April 2021), or the right to self-determination (see Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346/02, § 61, ECHR 2002-III). 113. The Court has also held that respect for private life requires that everyone should be able to establish details of their identity as individual human beings (see Mennesson v. France, no. 65192/11, § 96, ECHR 2014 (extracts)). It has also acknowledged the important repercussions that the regulation on birth registration and access to identity documents can have on personal autonomy (see, mutatis mutandis, Christine Goodwin, cited above, § 91). 114. The Court reiterates that although the object of Article 8 is essentially that of protecting an individual against an arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference. In addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private and family life (see Lozovyye v. Russia, no. 4587/09, § 36, 24 April 2018, and the case-law cited therein). 115. The principles applicable to assessing a State’s positive and negative obligations under the Convention are similar. Regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole, the aims in the second paragraph of Article 8 being of a certain relevance (see Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], no. 37359/09, § 65, ECHR 2014, and the case-law cited therein). The notion of “respect” is not clear cut, especially as far as positive obligations are concerned: having regard to the diversity of the practices followed and the situations obtaining in the Contracting States, the notion’s requirements will vary considerably from case to case (see Hämäläinen, cited above, § 66; see 30