Contrary to what has been stated by some European politicians, repatriation of their nationals from the al Hol and Roj camps is logistically possible and does not pose an insurmountable safety risk to the State officials involved. 87. In an interview with RSI, Anne Speckhard, Director of the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (‘ICSVE’) who has been involved in a number of repatriation processes, stated that she has never seen the AANES outright refuse to release individuals to their State of nationality for repatriation.71 On the basis of RSI’s research it is clear that the AANES have only ever permitted the removal of persons to States other than their State of nationality when explicit prior consent has been obtained from the State of nationality.72 This is unsurprising given that the engagement of the State of nationality is required to ensure that the individual being removed has access to appropriate documentation, including replacement or emergency passports or travel documents. Accordingly, responsibility squarely falls with the States of nationality as the only authorities to whom the AANES are likely to respond. 88. Past practice demonstrates that once a State decides to repatriate certain individuals, the State will avail itself of a pre-established and tested repatriation method. This entails a number of steps: first, State officials meet with AANES officials to discuss the transfer; second, identity checks (which can take the form of DNA testing) are carried out;73 third, a formal agreement is typically signed by foreign State and AANES officials, as occurred in the agreements signed to repatriate Dutch and French children on 10 June 2019, British children on 21 November 2019, and Norwegian nationals in January 2020; fourth, nationals are then typically delivered to foreign State officials and then removed from AANES territory (often by military aircraft using foreign military bases (US or Russian) in Syria)74 or from the city of Erbil in Kurdish-controlled Iraq, to where detainees may be transported by SDF officials.75 89. Further, as detailed above, European States appear to have some form of military or intelligence presence on the ground which may facilitate repatriations in practice, and the United States has offered to facilitate repatriation efforts alongside transport of ISIL suspects to trial and detention outside Syria.76 90. But rather than take steps to repatriate their nationals detained in the al Hol and Roj camps, European States have adopted a policy of consigning these detainees to indefinite unlawful detention in North East Syria rather than to bring them home to face justice and be dealt with properly according to law and in lawful conditions. Indeed, all five States which are the subject of this report have gone so far as to pass legislation permitting them to withdraw detainee nationals’ citizenship in absentia,77 creating new obstacles to repatriation and further complicating the question of State responsibility for those women and children as they remain in Syria. 91. The asserted justification for doing so has been the alleged security threat posed by these detainees. In the case of the UK, this was confirmed by the Foreign Office Minister, Lord Ahmad, who stated on 16 November 2020 in response to a parliamentary question on the subject that ‘Her Majesty’s Government’s assessment remains that risks posed by those adults who travelled to Syria are best managed outside the UK.’78 35 RIGHTS & SECURITY INTERNATIONAL