1.1.2. Denial of the Right to Self-Determination Although the recognition of the right to self-determination is relatively straight-forward as a matter of law, its implementation has proven more complex due to its dual obligation nature. The principle of self-determination consists not only of the duty of states to recognize, respect and promote the right of a people to self-determination, but also the obligation to refrain from taking any forcible action that serves to deny people the capacity to enjoy this right.28 As such, any action that undermines the capacity to enjoy the right and any denial of the substantive content of the right – free choice of political status and economic, social and cultural development – will amount to a violation under international law. To further clarify, since the exercise of the right to self-determination requires a people to claim it29 and a territory within which to assert it,30 any action that seeks to undermine either of these two elements will undermine self-determination and similarly constitute a violation of this right. Colonization and colonial practices are well understood by international law to constitute practices that serve to deny the right to self-determination. This is evidenced in the concurrent acceleration of the decolonization process and the codification of self-determination as a fundamental legal norm.31 The way in which colonial practices deny the right to self-determination has subsequently shaped its framing in the ICCPR and ICESCR. Namely, practices such as implantation of the settler-colonizer population, establishment of colonies, and extension of sovereignty into occupied territory clearly dilute the first pillar of the right to self-determination, while land confiscation and acquisition, integration of the economy, and denial of access to natural resources serve to deny the second pillar. The recognition and granting of self-determination to colonized people resulted in the emergence of more than 70 percent of present-day states.32 28 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, supra 14. 29 Jean-Francois Gareau, ‘’Shouting at the Wall: Self-Determination and the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,’’ Leiden Journal of International Law 18, no.3 (2005), 491. 30 “To confer on a people a right of “free choice” in the absence of more substantive entitlements – to territory, natural resources, etc. – would simply be meaningless. Clearly, the right of self-determination cannot be exercised in a substantive vaccum.” Catrionia Drew, ‘’The East Timor Story: International Law on Trial,’’ European Journal of International Law 12, no.4 (2001), 663, available at: http://www. ejil.org/pdfs/12/4/1539.pdf. 31 See Andrew Pullar, ‘’Rethinking Self-Determination,’’ Canterbury Law Review 20 (2014), available at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/CanterLawRw/2014/5.pdf. 32 Id., 92. 15