Schmid Comparative Migration Studies (2020) 8:25 170). The second possibility – stated as a conclusion in various pieces (e.g. Hollifield 2004, 905; Hollifield and Faruk 2017, 143) – is that “[e]ven as states become more dependent on trade and migration, they are likely to remain trapped in a liberal paradox for decades to come.” These two possibilities still feature in the current scholarly discourse. However, where Hollifield has envisioned a gradual resolution to the liberal paradox towards a comprehensively liberal model reconciling open borders and inclusive citizenship in the long run, others have suggested that more and more states show a seemingly ‘paradoxical’ configuration of open borders and exclusive citizenship. For instance, Boucher and Gest (2018) contrast the ‘Liberal Model’ with the ‘Market Model’. The latter embodies the tension between the openness towards certain (mostly temporary and high-skilled) labour migrants and the closure towards others, as well as patterns of citizenship exclusiveness. However, rather than ‘being trapped’ in this tension, governments may embrace it because it allows them “to have it both ways – effectively sanitizing globalisation from its purported ills while enjoying the benefits it brings” (ibid., p. 6). In the following, I suggest that not only two but four national boundary regime types should be theoretically possible and empirically observable. This is based on a theory of structural logics and their interaction in shaping coherent immigration regimes and coherent citizenship regimes, respectively. The resulting two-dimensional policy space and its four ideal-typical configurations follow from these structural logics. My starting point is the account of Hampshire (2013). He argues that there are four potentially ‘contradictory imperatives of the liberal state’ (ibid., p. 2). These are: capitalism, constitutionalism, representative democracy, and nationhood. Hampshire then goes on to argue that the former two tend to induce openness, while the latter two tend to generate closure. However, he also extends this structural account with a complex and comprehensive framework of how factors such as politicisation, public opinion, or labour market conditions, and actors such as far-right parties, courts, or firms may affect immigrationrelated policy-making in these four facets of the liberal state (ibid., p. 51–4). My modified version of Hampshire’s framework mirrors these liberal imperatives by focusing on the following structural logics: the economic logic of the market, the legal logic of the liberal state, the democratic logic of the liberal state, and the cultural logic of the nation. I shall argue that the former two are complementary in shaping immigration regimes, while the latter two are complementary in shaping citizenship regimes. Furthermore, I suggest that each structural logic comes in two variants, liberal or illiberal, open or closed, and inclusive or exclusive. The economic logic of the market is where, first and foremost, labour immigration policies can be located. They are embedded in the dynamics and the regulation of transnational trade and shaped by the behaviour and lobbying activity of labourintensive firms (Peters 2017). Because of their commitment to economic liberalism in the context of globalisation, democracies tend to allow certain interest groups – namely firms – to capture command in steering labour immigration. In the modern dual labour market, low-skilled and high-skilled immigration policies can thus expand simultaneously. This dynamic of ‘client politics’ is likely to emerge despite popular opposition because the costs of immigration for the broader and disorganised public are diffused, while the benefits are highly concentrated in well-organised business coalitions (Freeman 1995). Thus, the inherent tendency in the economic logic of the market Page 6 of 20