From a Traditional International Law Approach to a Human Rights-Based Approach to Statelessness These causes of statelessness, as identified by the ILC and traditional scholars, show that statelessness was primarily perceived as a technical, legal problem. The nexus between statelessness and discrimination was not yet clearly established. Nevertheless, the mass displacement and denationalisation of Jews during World War II drew some attention to how discrimination could play a role in causing statelessness. Some occasional references to the potentially discriminatory dimension of nationality deprivation can be found. In its report, the ILC stated that “some States have enacted special legislation providing for collective denationalisation on political, racial or religious grounds.”60 According to the ILC, collective denationalisation should be prohibited, as discrimination is inconsistent with the UN Charter.61 Weis also distinguished between ‘general denationalisation’ and ‘special or discriminatory denationalisation’, the latter “which is directed against certain groups of nationals and which is very frequently mass denationalisation.”62 By 1979, Weis wrote that “prohibition of discriminatory denationalisation may be regarded as a rule of present-day general international law.”63 Nevertheless, Weis still considered discriminatory denationalisation as a marginal exception in the general practice of nationality deprivation.64 The solutions proposed to solve statelessness were also of a technical, legal nature. According to the ILC, statelessness could be eliminated by the adoption of two rules: (a) if no other nationality is acquired at birth, the individual should acquire the nationality of the State in whose territory he is born; and (b) loss of nationality subsequent to birth shall be conditional on the acquisition of another nationality.65 Yet, the ILC equally recognised that a purely technical solution would not suffice, as a nationality must also be effective, and the conferment of a nationality must thus be accompanied by a conferment of its functions.66 Moreover, the ILC acknowledged that States were not willing to accept these two principles, and thus possible solutions must be focused on reducing statelessness, rather than eliminating it entirely.67 As a consequence, efforts to improve the status of stateless persons were considered necessary, since cases of statelessness were considered inevitable.68 Ultimately, the international response to statelessness gave rise to the two global Statelessness Conventions. The aim of the 1954 Convention was to set out a number of minimum rights for stateless persons. It is clear that these rights are merely minimal, and do not foster the ambition of realising the level of protection that a nationality offers (for example, political rights and the right to diplomatic protection are notably absent). The convention merely provides an interim protection status pending the acquisition of nationality, which remained the ultimate goal.69 As regards the aim of reducing statelessness, the 1961 Convention is clearly a product of the understanding of statelessness at the time, and was designed to offer technical solutions to the various causes of statelessness: conflicts of laws, renunciation, deprivation and loss of nationality, and State succession. Various provisions offer concrete guidance to States how statelessness can and must be prevented in case of conflicts of laws and nationality 60 ibid. ibid, 21. 62 Weis, ‘Statelessness as a legal political problem’ (n 13), 6. 63 Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law (n 48), 125. 64 ibid. 65 ILC ‘Report on Nationality, Including Statelessness by Mr. Manly O. Hudson, Special Rapporteur’ (1952) Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1952, Vol. 2, 20. 66 ibid. 67 ibid. 68 ibid. 69 Laura van Waas, Nationality Matters: Statelessness under International Law (Intersentia 2008), 364. 61 European University Institute 7