38.2 (7) TEMPROSA.DOCX38.2 (7) TEMPROSA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 276 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1/16/2021 12:59 PM [Vol. 38:2 between human rights that flowed from the dignity of the person and civil rights that are derived from belonging to a distinct political community willing to enforce rights. 220 Stateless persons generally lose all rights. 221 For Arendt, who made the argument that there is a link between the State and rights, belonging to a community as a citizen constituted "the right to have rights." 222 Arendt explained, "[t]he question was not, as for Hamlet, to be or not to be, but to belong or not to belong." 223 Aristotle's idea that humans are political animals and that political rights are the door to other rights proved central to Arendt's philosophy. 224 US Chief Justice Earl Warren's famous dissent in Perez v. Brownell neatly captured Arendtian philosophy. Chief Justice Warren described the right to citizenship as "man's basic right for it is nothing less than the right to have rights."225 States are, in the words of Brad K. Blitz and Maureen Lynch, "the principal guarantor[s] of human rights." 226 While Arendt's framework distinguished between human rights and the right to citizenship, both rights exist within States. 227 States have rights and responsibilities under international law as primary actors. 228 Oppenheim's famous statement in the first half of the twentieth century was that States were the only subjects of the law of nations. 229 Arendt's thinking on the "right to have rights" is now, however, challenged. 230 Arendt's notion of the "right to have rights" could be viewed as a moral claim or a performative right in the linguistic sense. 231 The former sense means that States bear the deontological duty to protect humans by providing the right to nationality and opening the door for full human rights protection. 232 The latter means that the 'right to have rights' could be interpreted as "a right brought into 220. Id. 221. Id. at 290–302. 222. See generally ARENDT, supra note 219. 223. Id. at 84. 224. Meghna Kajla, Nation-State and its Production of Statelessness: A Study of Chin Refugees, in DETERRITORIALISED IDENTITY AND TRANSBORDER MOVEMENT IN SOUTH ASIA 91, 101 (Nasir Uddin & Nasreen Chowdhory eds., 2019). 225. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958). 226. See Brad Blitz & Maureen Lynch, Statelessness and the Deprivation of Nationality, in STATELESSNESS AND CITIZENSHIP: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON THE BENEFITS OF NATIONALITY 1, 4 (Brad K. Blitz & Maureen Lynch eds., 2011). 227. Kajla, supra note 224, at 101. 228. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 197 (6th ed. 2008). 229. See generally HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1950). 230. See SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS (2004). Benhabib extended Arendt's idea to the "rights of others"—the right of an outsider of a State to political membership. She questioned the idea of the State as the sole authority in denying (and giving) rights to outsiders. 231. Stephanie DeGooyer, The Right…, in THE RIGHT TO HAVE RIGHTS 18, 21–24 (Stephanie DeGooyer et al. eds., 2018). 232. Id. (citing Seyla Benhabib, Human Rights and the Critique of "Humanitarian Reason" (2004), https://www.resetdoc.org/story/human-rights-and-the-critique-of-humanitarian-reason/ (last visited May 2, 2019)).