38.2 (7) TEMPROSA.DOCX38.2 (7) TEMPROSA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2020] STATELESSNESS AS RHETORIC 1/16/2021 12:59 PM 273 State can "read its substantive conception of world society as well as its view of the extent of sovereign freedom into legal concepts and categories." 201 The absence of a duty by the non-determining State to cooperate with a determining State's procedures compounds this reliance on belief. A variety of interpretations can be drawn from a State's silence or refusal to respond to a request verifying citizenship status. 202 The non-communication between States could take place while applicants for recognition of stateless status remain in detention. Applicants may be detained for months or even years, and many do not receive diplomatic assistance. 203 In Kim v. Russia, the European Court of Human Rights found that an applicant had been "left to languish for months and years, locked up in his cell, without any authority taking an active interest in his fate and wellbeing." 204 Equally important, because a determining State cannot compel cooperation or demand information from other States, the State may rule on a person's status based on an incomplete set of information or an erroneous interpretation and application of another State's law. States do not know, and are presumed not to know, the laws of other States. 205 The State determining stateless status thus runs the risk of performing legally incorrect analysis. In sum, the State engages in a construction of who is, and who is not, stateless based on a gaze. Thus, the definition presents a paradox because the State determines who is in fact stateless, based on law that States themselves create and implement. Not only does the term "statelessness" bear multiple meanings, but whatever its "autonomous and international meaning" 206 is, it is relativized in relation to the State's concept of who is the 'other' based on its own interests and values. 207 201. See Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 1 EUR. J. INT'L L. 4, 30 (1990) (speaking in the general context of international law). 202. To illustrate, in B2 v. The Secretary of State for the Home Department, UK Justice Jackson wrote that a non-determining State may choose not to respond to a request from a determining State to confirm whether an individual is its national. As UK Justice Jackson explained, the non-determining State may lack institutional capacity to carry out the necessary investigations or may simply be unwilling to respond. It should be noted that Justice Jackson in turn relied on UNHCR's analysis. See B2 v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, (2013) E.W.C.A. Civ. 616, ¶ 36 (May 24). 203. For information on the detention of applicants, see Amal de Chickera & Nina Murray, Protecting Stateless Persons from Arbitrary Detention (2017), .https://www.statelessness.eu/sites/www.statelessness.eu/files/attachments/resources/ENS_LockeInLimbo_Detention_Agenda_online.pdf. (last visited May 2, 2019). 204. Kim v. Russia, Application no. 44260/13, Eur. Ct. H.R., p. 11, para. 54. 205. For problems in the proof and interpretation of foreign law, see generally Jacob Dolinger, Application, Proof, and Interpretation of Foreign Law: A Comparative Study in Private International Law, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 225 (1995). For a much earlier overview, see Arthur Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L. J. 1018 (1941). 206. See UNHCR, Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the case of AS (Guinea) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department before the Court of Appeal (Civil Division), C5/2016/3473/A, ¶13 (Feb. 20, 2018) [hereinafter UNHCR Submission in AS (Guinea)] (asserting that the definition of statelessness has autonomous and international meaning). 207. See Ronald Lee, Ideographic Criticism, in RHETORICAL CRITICISM 285, 296 (Jim Kuypers ed., 2009). An ideograph is always understood in relation to the 'other.'