38.2 (7) TEMPROSA.DOCX38.2 (7) TEMPROSA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 260 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1/16/2021 12:59 PM [Vol. 38:2 the second approach, itself works from the premise of State discretion, 113 as the Hague Convention primarily promotes deference to the State. 114 Second, the first approach emphasizes the law, while the second approach emphasizes both the law and the facts attendant to the individual's circumstances. However, applying the first approach also compels the determiner to examine an individual's factual circumstances. In determining statelessness, an individual or group of individuals presents their case before a determination officer—either a judge or an administrative officer—who considers their personal circumstances. Whether in the first or second approach, a State cannot determine an individual's citizenship status without an analysis of the attendant facts and their personal circumstances. If State Y determines A's citizenship status, it would have to determine if A is born in State X to ascertain which relevant provisions of State X's law must be included in its analysis. State Y has to consider A's life events and personal and family histories, including their residence, work, education, and other intimate details of life, from the most banal to the monumental. Otherwise, an adjudicator would not know which provisions of law are relevant to their analysis. Both approaches thus involve mixed questions of law and fact. Perhaps what the second approach ultimately does, or hopes to do, is urge the State to exercise due diligence in fulfilling its obligations under the 1954 Statelessness Convention by engaging the State to look more carefully at the individual's situation whose citizenship or stateless status is under determination. In the second approach, the State is encouraged to be more diligent and look into a myriad of evidence, mainly documentary and oral evidence or narratives, relating to the facts and circumstances of the individual and the laws of other States. However, there are still significant challenges to the execution of the statelessness regime under the two approaches. For example, in both approaches, it is challenging to ascertain the information relevant for determining non-citizenship or stateless status. Here, negative evidence is required, and it is highly dependent on the cooperation other States. At minimum and depending on the situation, without direct, relevant, and clear evidence from other States, a determining State may merely have perceptions of people's status. 113. See Peter Spiro, Citizenship, Nationality, and Statelessness, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MIGRATION 281, 283 (Vincent Chetail & Céline Bauloz eds., 2014). 114. McDougal et al., supra note 68, at 914–15; see also Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Second Phase, 1955 I.C.J. 1, 4 (Apr. 6) [hereinafter "Nottebohm Case"]; Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4 (Feb. 7) [hereinafter "Nationality Decrees Case"].