12 II. The Arkansas Supreme Court’s order denying Petitioners’ fee motion does not fairly appear to rest on federal law, rather than Petitioners’ state law procedural default. While federal substantive law governs attorney’s fee requests under 42 U.S.C. 1988, Arkansas procedural rules govern whether a fee request is timebarred and whether it was filed in the proper court. See Hart, The Relations between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 508 (1954) (“The general rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them.”). Petitioners do not argue otherwise. See Pet. 14–15 (acknowledging Arkansas’s procedural rules regarding attorney’s fees). Under Arkansas law, where a party “fail[s] to comply with Rule 54(e) of the rules of civil procedure,” which Petitioners concede governs attorney’s fee requests, she “is not entitled to receive attorney’s fees or other expenses.” Norman v. Norman, 66 S.W.3d 635, 640 (Ark. 2002); see also Morehouse v. Lawson, 206 S.W.3d 295, 300 (Ark. Ct. App. 2005) (reversing trial court’s award of attorney’s fees where motion was untimely under Rule 54(e)). Here, Petitioners failed to comply with Arkansas’s procedural rules governing attorney’s fee requests and therefore forfeited any ability to seek the fees they requested. In the proceedings below, Petitioners argued that the trial court was the proper court to consider Petitioners’ request for appellate attorney’s fees. Yet they actually submitted their request for appellate fees