18 ALPEYEVA AND DZHALAGONIYA v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT establish with certainty the applicants’ intention to mislead it (see, by contrast, Gross, cited above, § 36). 101. In view of the above, the Court does not consider that the applicants’ conduct amounted to an abuse of the right of petition. Accordingly, the Government’s objection is dismissed. 2. Victim status 102. The Court must first ascertain whether the applicants remain victims of an alleged violation of Article 8, when account is taken of the fact that on 14 April 2009 and 23 April 2013 respectively they were granted Russian citizenship. 103. The Court reiterates that a decision or measure favourable to the applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive him of his status as a “victim” unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention (see Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, § 180, ECHR 2006-V). 104. In the cases at hand, there is no evidence that the authorities have acknowledged a breach of the applicants’ rights in connection with the seizure of the first applicant’s Russian passport in 2006 and the refusal to exchange the second applicant’s Russian passport in 2010. Furthermore, the Court notes that the applicants’ complaints concern not just the very fact of the seizure of the passport or the refusal to exchange it, but the whole scope of the ensuing practical difficulties they encountered in their everyday life on account of the lack of a valid identity document. In the Court’s view, the fact that the applicants were eventually granted Russian citizenship could not in itself be considered to constitute sufficient redress for the fact that, over the course of several years, each of the applicants had been a stateless person without a valid passport. The Court has no information in respect of any other type of redress which may have been afforded to them. 105. The Court therefore concludes that the applicants can still be considered victims. 3. Conclusion 106. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. D. Merits 1. General principles 107. The Court reiterates that the notion of “private life” within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention is a broad concept which