A Teleological and Child-Sensitive Interpretation refugee criteria.46 Despite support from the UNCHR47 and some states (against the predominant tide of state practice) to grant refugee status to family members who have satisfied the refugee definition, this recommendation did not grapple with, or address, the fact that the Refugee Convention does not prescribe this approach and that refugee status determination is individualistic and personal to the refugee claimant.48 As such, there remains no remedy or substitute in the recommendation for the protection gap identified. The absence of any child-specific treatment in the definition has caused UNHCR and prominent academics to describe children as ‘invisible’ in the Refugee Convention and its early application. 49 Arnold reasons that the siloing of child rights in international law was possibly ‘for fear of undermining the rights of the family unit’, or because children were not considered by the drafters of the Refugee Convention as significant or as important beneficiaries of protection in their own right.50 Other academics specialising in child rights have critiqued that the Refugee Convention has largely been applied through an ‘adult-centred perspective’. 51 UNHCR notes that the refugee definition has traditionally been interpreted in light of adult experiences and many claims made by children have been ‘assessed incorrectly or overlooked altogether’. 52 What may be distilled from this is that the ‘Refugee Convention is not an adequate framework for child applicants on its own as it did not sufficiently consider their particular needs, abilities and circumstances’.53 It was not until the 1980s, with the advent of the CRC, that a child-sensitive framework emerged, reaffirming the core human rights contained in salient treaties such as the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,54 and introducing rights specifically tailored to children. Such rights included the best interests of the child principle contained in art 3.55 These developments activated a precipitous shift from the concept of children as passive dependents to active subjects and rights-bearers.56 This shift in understanding was critical given the individualised nature of refugee status determination, where child claimants must alone satisfy the elements of the refugee definition in order to be recognised as refugees. 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (UNHCR 2011) 36 [181]–[185]. ibid. New Zealand, for example, does not accord derivative refugee status to children of refugees independent of any inquiry as to whether they individually meet the refugee definition: see GD (China) [2021] NZIPT 801793-94, 11 [45]. Pobjoy (n 38) 5, 46. Arnold (n 31) 82. Pobjoy (n 38) 5. ibid 3. Arnold (n 31) 95. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976). See CRC (n 15), and interpretive commentary that has ensued, including the Guidelines on International Protection: Child Asylum Claims under Articles 1(A)2 and 1(F) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (UNHCR 22 December 2009); Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Conclusion on Children at Risk No. 107 (LVIII), UN Doc A/AC.96/1048 (5 October 2007) 5–8 [14](b)(x). Pobjoy (n 38) 6–7. 15