Statelessness and the Lives of the Children of Migrants 31 but practically difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, children of Indonesians are fairly unlikely to fall into the category of de jure stateless children. The situation for the children and grandchildren of Filipino nationals is much more complex. The Philippines does not have a consulate in Sabah (on the island of Borneo) but in Kuala Lumpur (in peninsular Malaysia). This is largely because of ongoing political sensitivities surrounding the Philippines’ historical claim to Sabah as a former part of the ‘Sultanate of Sulu’.13 This ‘claim’ is hotly disputed by ‘native’ Sabahans, and its political fallout contributes to anti-Filipino sentiment in the state.14 Moreover, it is practically difficult for Filipinos in Sabah to obtain documents, given both the expense of travelling, and the fact that holders of IMM13 ‘refugee’ cards are unable to leave Sabah. The majority of those who might use the services of mobile registration units (which occasionally visit Sabah) do not know of their existence. Thus, whilst the government of the Philippines is known to be ‘generous’ in granting citizenship to even the undocumented children or grandchildren of refugees and migrants who claim it, in practice most are unable to make such a claim. Though the extent to which this renders the descendants of Filipinos vulnerable to statelessness may be debatable, such people clearly lack what has been termed an ‘effective nationality’.15 During my fieldwork with children and their families over the past year, my attention has also been drawn to the emotional realities that complicate discussions of citizenship or belonging on the ground. Take 10 year-old Aisyah, a Suluk girl holding an IMM13 card, whose grandparents came to Sabah as refugees in the 1970s. Once, during a discussion with her class about the differences between Sabah and the Philippines, Aisyah told me: ‘I don’t know anything about the Philippines’. She has no family that she knows of left there, has never been there, and explicitly refuses to discuss it as a place with which she should have any connection. As holders of IMM13 cards, Aisyah and her parents are 13 14 15 On the Sultanate of Sulu see James F. Warren, The Sulu Zone, 1768-1898: The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State (Singapore University Press, 1981). In 2013, such sentiments were enflamed when an armed group, claiming to represent the modern-day Sultan of Sulu, entered Sabah from the Philippines. The ‘Lahad Datu standoff’ ended in violence and has led to the creation of a special security zone in eastern Sabah. See Associated Press, ‘Malaysia launches air strikes against squatter sultan’s Filipino army’ The Guardian (Kuala Lumpur, 5 March 2013) <http://www.theguardian .com/world/2013/mar/05/malaysia-bombs-borneo-expel-sultan> accessed 21 October 2013. Brad Blitz, ‘Advocacy Campaigns and Policy Development’ (2009) 32 Forced Migration Review 25, 25-26. tilburg law review 19 (2014) 26-34