34 D. Owen 5. All SCNs shall have a fair opportunity of acquiring nationality in the member state of residence and all SCNs who do not have nationality in their member state of residence shall be eligible to vote in national elections of their member state of nationality. Any of these five general rules would suffice to address the democratic wrong but which is the best choice? Or, to tie our discussion back to the proposed ECI, why ought we privilege (1)? There are three dimensions to the issue of which is the best choice. First, which rule offers the best fit with the institutional structure of the EU? Second, which rule is easiest to adopt and implement? Third, what are the likely costs and side-effects of the different rules? On the first score, the ECI proposal does not do well because it misconstrues the current composition of the EU as a polity. This claim can be elucidated by contrasting the EU with purely intergovernmental and fully federalised systems that are also committed to free movement within the territorial area that they cover. In the case of a purely intergovernmental structure, the norm of free movement is grounded on a joint commitment to a shared aim or purpose such as, for example, a European market. In terms of the national citizenship of the states involved in this intergovernmental project, the context remains largely equivalent to that of independent states who are not engaged in such a project, but not wholly since the shared purpose brings into play the principle that the partners to this project should not act to frustrate this joint enterprise and should, where compatible with their distinct national contexts and projects, aim to facilitate it. Such a principle could be expressed by, for example, offering preferential treatment to the citizens of partner states for access to membership rights and for dual citizenship. In the contrasting case of a fully federalised system, free movement may serve instrumental purposes but fundamentally expresses a basic liberty of citizens as federal citizens which requires that anyone exercising their right to cross state borders must not be disadvantaged at any level of the franchise within the federal structure. An obvious way to respect this democratic commitment is to adopt a residence-based rule for voting rights in the states that comprise the federal union. But the EU is neither a purely intergovernmental nor a fully federalised body. Because it isn’t simply intergovernmental it is a democratic wrong for EU citizens who move across state borders to lose national voting rights; because it isn’t simply federal the ECI proposal of a residence-based voting rule isn’t an ideal fit as a way of ensuring political equality for EU citizens. Option (5), rather than option (1), looks like the