expand the concept of de facto statelessness into new areas, not all of which can be fully reconciled with the traditional view referred to above. For example, the expanded concept tends to suggest that de facto stateless persons may include certain persons who are inside the State of their nationality, not just those who are outside it. Part II analyzes in detail the main categories of persons who have been claimed to fit this new paradigm of de facto statelessness, notably: • • • Persons who do not enjoy the rights attached to their nationality; Persons who are unable to establish their nationality, or who are of undetermined nationality; Persons who, in the context of State succession, are attributed the nationality of a State other than the State of their habitual residence. Part II concludes that the new paradigm of de facto statelessness is doctrinally questionable and serves no useful purpose, since in some cases the persons concerned are actually de jure stateless, in other cases they fit the traditional conception of de facto statelessness, and in yet other cases they should not be considered de facto stateless at all. Part III concludes that the traditional definition of de facto statelessness is still valid in the present day, and proposes an interpretation of that definition. It also provides a few brief conclusions regarding the scope ratione materiae and ratione personae of UNHCR’s mandate for addressing de facto statelessness. iii