nationality not based on an effective link is a more general one, the scope of application of paragraph 1 is limited to the nonopposability of a nationality acquired or retained following a succession of States.189 Thus, even should there be a situation where, in the context of State succession, the State of nationality does not have a right under international law to extend its diplomatic protection to persons who against their will have become its nationals instead of becoming nationals of the State of their habitual residence, States may not lawfully treat such persons as stateless. There would therefore be nothing to be gained in UNHCR considering such persons as stateless either. This of course is without prejudice to such persons being treated as refugees by UNHCR and by States if they fall within the definition of the 1951 Refugee Convention. In conclusion, it is submitted that: 1. The term “de facto stateless” does not apply to persons who, in the context of State succession, against their will acquire the nationality of a State other than the State with which they have a genuine and effective link through habitual residence. 2. Persons who are refugees within the meaning of the 1951 Refugee Convention are an exception. However, such persons should be treated as refugees, not merely as stateless persons. 9. CONCLUSIONS OF PART II Part II has analyzed three categories of persons who have been claimed in the literature to be de facto stateless: • • • Persons who do not enjoy the rights attached to their nationality; Persons who are unable to establish their nationality, or who are of undetermined nationality; Persons who, in the context of State succession, are attributed the nationality of a State other than the State of their habitual residence. The conclusion from the analysis above is that each of these categories is invalid, since in some cases the persons concerned are actually de jure stateless, in other cases they fit the traditional conception of de facto statelessness, and in yet other cases they should not be considered de facto stateless at all. 189 International Law Commission, “Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-first session”, op. cit., pp. 39 - 40. 60