48 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 25(1) to the vital interests of the Brazilian State’, even if this would result in statelessness. This declaration corresponds to Article 12(4)(1) of the Brazilian Constitution, however, the constitutional provision speaks about ‘national interests’. For the purposes of the 1961 Convention, this would need to be given in the interpretation of vital interests of the Brazilian State. New Zealand’s declaration, which literally follows the wording of Section 16 of the New Zealand Citizenship Act of 1977, specifies the ground of acting in a ‘manner that is contrary to the interests of New Zealand’. In order to conform to the grounds set out in the Convention this should be read as ‘contrary to the vital interests of New Zealand’. C. The United Kingdom The United Kingdom, in a similar fashion to Ireland, limited the scope of its declaration to naturalized persons. In the declaration, United Kingdom cites the grounds of Article 8(3)(a)(i) and (ii) verbatim. The corresponding national provision at the time of ratification was Section 20(3) of the British Nationality Act 1948, which allowed for the deprivation of citizenship on grounds of disloyal act or speech, different forms of collaboration with the enemy and sentences to imprisonment in any country for more than 12 months within the first five years of naturalisation. These grounds could be observed to be broader in scope than what is permitted under Article 8(3) but as they have been repealed, this analysis will focus on the currently enacted legislation. Pursuant to Article 8(3), the currently enacted legislation is required to comply with the material scope of Article 8(3) and can additionally not go beyond the scopes of the declaration of the United Kingdom and the corresponding national provision at that time. The British Nationality Act of 1948 was replaced by the British Nationality Act 1981 and the newly introduced Section 40 was subsequently amended on 1 April 2003 and 16 June 2005. The amendments extended the scope of grounds which allowed for deprivation.40 However, the new provisions also introduced the essential limitation that no deprivation should be permitted, where the individual concerned would become stateless as a consequence. Thus, the United Kingdom effectively stopped making use of the its right to retain grounds of deprivation under Article 8(3). However, by virtue of Clause 60 of the Immigration Bill (2014) the government of the United Kingdom reintroduced a ground on the basis of its Article 8(3) declaration. Accordingly, a naturalized person may be deprived of his citizenship, even if the individual concerned becomes stateless as a consequence, where ‘the Secretary of State is satisfied that the deprivation is conducive to the public good because the person, while having that citizenship status, has conducted him or herself in a manner which is seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom ( . . . )’.41 While the material scope of this newly introduced provision is consistent with the declaration submitted by the United Kingdom under Article 8(3), the legality of the reintroduction of a previously withdrawn ground is questionable. Upon the introduction of the Immigration Bill, the Home Secretary expressed the view that the United Kingdom had decided in 2003 to go beyond the obligations of the 1961 Convention and that the return to the standard of the 1961 Convention 40. Parliament of the United Kingdom: Home Affairs, ‘Deprivation of British citizenship and withdrawal of passport facilities’, Parliament of the United Kingdom (2017), http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Sum mary/SN06820#fullreport. 41. Section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981. See also E. Fripp, The Law and Practice of Expulsion and Exclusion from the United Kingdom (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014), para. 12.21.