‘Myanmar’s preliminary objections are, frankly, in direct conflict with the aims which the Genocide Convention pursues. If they succeeded, in whole or in part, they would seriously undermine the value of the Convention and its protections...Because it is fundamental to the Convention ⎯ and to any functioning legal order ⎯ that its parties be equipped to hold each other to account by the institution of proceedings before this Court whenever there has been an apparent breach. Without that… [the Convention] would quickly become a dead letter; and this Court would be toothless.’xxvi The Court’s decision on the preliminary objections will be delivered at a public sitting, the date of which has yet to be announced at the time of writing. Until the case concludes, the State of Myanmar is obliged to continue reporting on its compliance with the provisional measures ordered by the Court every six months. C. The ICJ’s provisional measures order Provisional measures are the equivalent of a legal injunction or court order, instructing a State to immediately take certain steps prior to a final ruling on the case.xxvii As part of its case filing, the Gambia included an urgent request for the Court to order provisional measures in light of ‘the ongoing, severe and irreparable harm being suffered by members of the Rohingya group.’xxviii On 23 January 2020, the ICJ issued a relatively rare unanimous order on provisional measures. The Court described the Rohingya remaining in Myanmar as ‘extremely vulnerable’. As part of its rationale for issuing the order, the ICJ made it clear that, ‘Myanmar has not presented to the Court concrete measures aimed specifically at recognizing and ensuring the right of the Rohingya to exist as a protected group under the Genocide Convention.’xxix In short, the provisional measures order recognises that Myanmar’s actions prior to the order were wholly inadequate to protect the Rohingya. It creates an expectation that Myanmar must take concrete measures in order to meet its obligations under the Genocide Convention.xxx At the heart of this case there are two key legal issues. The first is whether the State of Myanmar has already committed genocide against the Rohingya. The second is whether genocidal acts continue to take place, with genocidal intent.xxxi Without prejudging the merits of the case - i.e. whether or not genocide has already taken place - the ICJ ordered Myanmar to ‘take all measures within its power’ to prevent irreparable harm against the Rohingya. Critically assessing Myanmar’s compliance with the order is therefore of the utmost importance. In brief, the provisional measures imposed by the Court require Myanmar to prevent the commission of genocidal acts, ensure security forces and those under its influence do not commit or incite genocide, preserve evidence of alleged genocidal acts, and report back within four months on its compliance with the order and every six months thereafter until the case concludes.xxxii Under the UN Charter, which includes the Statute of the Court, all member States must comply with ICJ decisions.xxxiii However, to date the State of Myanmar is not under any legal obligation to make its reports public. In June 2020, 30 Rohingya organisations including BROUK submitted an open letter to the ICJ requesting that the reports be made available to allow for full public scrutiny of Myanmar’s compliance with the order and to avoid undermining Rohingya confidence in the ICJ proceedings.xxxiv There has been no response from the ICJ. Rakhine State context Military tensions have been rising between the Arakan Army (AA) and the Tatmadaw since November last year when BROUK published its last briefing to coincide with ICJ reporting deadlines. Local residents reported sporadic armed clashes between the two sides in the northern townships of Buthidaung and Maungdaw in late January and early February. In central Rakhine State, skirmishes were reported in Kyauktaw in January and in Myebon in April.xxxv The uneasy informal ceasefire between the two sides appears to be hanging by a thread, with the AA commander-in-chief warning his soldiers to ‘prepare for war’ in April.xxxvi Since the attempted military coup, the political wing of the AA, the United League of Arakan (ULA), has established a parallel administration to rival the junta’s State Administrative Council (SAC) across most of Rakhine State. This apparatus includes its own judiciary, revenue department, public security offices and other institutions. Some analysts estimate that the ULA-AA now exerts administrative control over two-thirds 5