179 “long-distance nationalism” (Anderson, 1993; Glick-Schiller and Fouron, 2001) and deterritorialized national formations (Basch et al., 1993). Untethering citizenship from territory, these demonstrated evolved forms of sociopolitical status, from “dual citizenship” by post-Soviet states (Verdery, 1998) to “transnational kinship” of Haitian immigrants, sustaining monetary and ideological commitments to the future of family and nation (Glick-Schiller and Fouron, 2001). However, the aforementioned populations’ movements were motivated by the flow of global capital, favored by the global order of nation-states (Rockefeller, 2011). Noel Salazar and Alan Smart (2011) note how states create “regimes of immobility,” wherein certain forms of migration are encouraged—businessmen, tourists, students—and others are discouraged and/or criminalized—undocumented migrants and refugees. Thus, expansion of citizenship included certain people while continuing to exclude others. The sovereign power of the modern states rests as much on enforcing these exclusions as it does on delineating belonging (Agamben, 1998, 2005). The state’s preoccupation with “the ordering and disciplining of mobile people” (Scott, 1999) renders a category of people liminal—those who move despite states’ intentions. For instance, Sara Shneiderman’s (2013) concept of “border citizens” illustrates how states create new categories to accommodate and monitor populations. Similarly, Sarah Smith and Heide Castaneda’s (2021) study on Chuukese migrants reveals “graduated citizenship,” where individuals have visa-free US entry but lack full citizenship rights. States also resort to complete exclusion and persecution, as with undocumented migrants (Andersson, 2014; De León, 2015; Sadiq, 2008). Moreover, ethnographies reveal how populations challenge statist designs in a variety of ways, including escaping the political control of the state (Scott, 2009), subterfuge (De León, 2012; Sadiq, 2008), or acquiring citizenship and/or representation despite the state’s motives (Asad, 2023; Galli, 2023; Sadiq, 2008). Among populations rendered liminal, refugees and political asylees occupy a distinct position. Liisa Malkki (1995, 516) has shown how the “national order of things”—the organizational and conceptual frameworks used to categorize and manage populations—both “secretes displacement, as well as prescribes correctives for displacement.” These “correctives” include systems, policies, and laws that confer refugee status, provide “relief,” and provide a pathway to citizenship. This experience often involves refugee “wait”—an institutional and existential condition of waiting for rehabilitation or political emancipation through citizenship (Adhikari, 2021; Brun, 2015; Haas, 2017, 2023; Rotter, 2016). However, while “wait” conditions correctives in the Global North, countries in the Global South, where most refugees reside, often have policies (or the lack thereof) that keep communities in protracted and intergenerational statelessness. India—not a signatory of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol—is an example. The Indian citizenship regime is particularly hostile to refugees (Chatterji, 2007; Chimni, 1994; Zamindar, 2010); most remain ineligible for citizenship. Natasha Raheja (2022, 538) has shown that the state fails to recognize Pakistani Hindu refugees as Indian citizens, despite their “conditional recognition as national subjects.” Farhana Ibrahim (2020) finds that Pakistani Hindus who are granted legal status find themselves insufficiently integrated into the nation. Second-generation Tibetans face the opposite situation: while they have the right to become Indian citizens by birth, their Tibetan national identity has been used first to disqualify them from citizenship and then to force a choice between belonging to the Tibetan community and becoming an Indian citizen. TIBETAN REFUGEES IN INDIA Despite India’s long, albeit complex history of ethnic plurality, India does not allow legal integration of Tibetan refugees through citizenship, even as it permits their pursuit of a collective future. Tibetan refugees in India find themselves in the “gray zone,” a space that blurs lines between “the stranger, the victim, the criminal, and the undocumented visitor” (Appadurai, 2019). This liminal category emerges from a documentary regime enforced by the RC—an identity card required for Tibetans to legally reside in India. This card undergirds the state-refugee relationship. Following the Tibetan uprising of 1959, the first generation of Tibetan refugees were given RCs on arrival in India. The RC provides limited opportunities to work and study, as well as open bank accounts, obtain driver’s licenses, and 15552934, 2024, 2, Downloaded from https://anthrosource.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/plar.12580 by Test, Wiley Online Library on [07/03/2025]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License DISAGGREGATING CITIZENSHIP