Frost C  omparative Migration Studies (2024) 12:23 Any person that has a valid or expired Israeli occupation ID card; [Bridge-crossing] Green Card holders; Anyone who left Palestine between 1967 and 1988 and holds an Israeli ID card, among those covered by the census which was carried out by the Israeli occupation after 1967; and Anyone holding Arab identification documents.” A high-level government official confirmed that there has been “literally a checklist of things to look for to pull citizenship.”42 Despite efforts to compile these secret regulations, it is difficult to ascertain them at a given time without being subjected to them. As one former minister stated, who held ministerial portfolios in the 1990s, these regulations “have been changing,” and “the Minister of Interior plays a role in dictating these policies.”43 Moreover, officials often do not inform individuals that they lost their nationality until they interact with the MOI during routine transactions, such as registering a birth (Human Rights Watch, 2010, 3). Although there are no clear figures on how many individuals have been affected, one lawyer stated that about 10,000 Palestinian-Jordanians lost their nationality after the disengagement.44 A former minister suggested that there were 4,000–6,000 nationality revocations total,45 while another former minister indicated that there were about 1600–1700 of these revocations a year.46 Regardless of the numbers, hidden intentional ambiguity clearly characterizes this gap between 67ers’ access to Jordanian nationality in the law and implementation. Conclusion These examples highlight that implementation gaps can materialize in clear divergences between a policy’s law and its corresponding regulations. Further, they demonstrate that senior policymakers oversee and enact this type of implementation gap, accentuating that it is not accidental, but is intentional. Although this paper does not focus on why intentional ambiguity emerges, I theorize in other work, that the role of competing pressures and constraints on executive leaders, from influential actors interested in the policy, is key to motivating this law-regulation gap.47 Essentially, intentional ambiguity enables leaders to respond to contradictory imperatives by satisfying one in law and another in regulations, as long as the hypocrisy costs of doing so are low. Jordan has long-faced contradictory pressures and constraints due to the unresolved Palestinian-Israeli conflict and uncertain future of a Palestinian state. At times, this has materialized in Jordan’s efforts to maintain backchannels with Israeli leaders, often with the hope of regaining more Palestinian territory, while publicly aligning with Arab sentiments that demand Israeli concessions before entering negotiations and that emphasize Palestinian (not Jordanian) sovereignty over the West Bank. At others, the contradictions 42 43 44 45 46 47 High-level government official (II77), January 2016. Former minister (LG53), January 2016. Jordanian lawyer and rights activist (OK89), January 2016. Former minister (GR25), June 2017. Former minister (MO43), October 2019. Author book manuscript in progress. Page 14 of 18