Too old to be a ‘foundling’? – International standards and comparative analysis – As the first example of such conduct, the Commentary to the Draft Conclusion 5(2) paragraph 14 refers to the UNHCR’s Handbook related to the 1951 Convention; Reports by international organisations, which are prepared on the basis of a mandate to provide accounts on State practice in a particular field, may be very important when assessing such practice. For example, the Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (….) is an important work that reflects and thus provides guidance for State practice (emphasis added). Further, some authors characterise the interpretative value of UNHCR guidance as possibly falling within the scope of supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 of the VCLT, and Goodwin-Gill as ‘subsidiary means’ under Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute.66 While the above was said about the 1951 Convention-related handbook and guidelines, and much less has been said about the UNHCR’s handbook and guidelines on statelessness published only in recent years, this description by analogy can be applicable to these materials. Indeed, for example, a decision by the Hungarian Constitutional Court on 23 February 2015 commented on the authoritative nature of UNHCR’s guidelines on statelessness, stating that: [W]hile the [UNHCR] Guidelines belong to the so-called non-binding international instruments, it is nevertheless indisputable that UNHCR is the most authentic entity to interpret international legal questions and practice related to the Statelessness Convention.67 Essentially, the reasons why states and courts generally do take into consideration soft-law standards such as the recommendations of treaty bodies or UNHCR guidelines are not because they are ‘legally binding’ (indeed, they are not) but because these standards are developed for the purpose of ensuring the proper and harmonised interpretation,68 and because of the evolutive nature of international human rights law. F. Conclusions of Section II: Need for evolutionary and teleological interpretation This section explained how VCLT rules would be applied in interpreting Article 2 of the 1961 Convention. Section II.A asserted that as an international human rights treaty, the Convention warranted an evolutionary and teleological approach to ensure an effective realisation of its objective, which is to reduce statelessness. Section II.B explained how the comparative analysis of 142 states’ foundling provisions and practice in some states (discussed in sections III and IV below) were relevant in interpreting the 1961 Convention, which was because domestic legislation and judicial precedents qualified as subsequent practice either under Article 31(3)(b) or as supplementary means under Article 32 of VCLT. Section II.C asserted that the grant of nationality to foundlings is a customary international law norm. Thus, the legislation/practices of non-state parties to the 1961 Convention (referred to in sections III and IV below) are relevant in interpreting its Article 2. Section II.D explained how provisions of other treaties, including the 1930 Convention and the CRC, are to be considered as per Article 31(3)(c) of VCLT. Section II.E asserted that the soft law standards, such as the CRC Committee’s General Comments and UNHCR Guidelines No.4, that reflect the subsequent 66 Gardiner (n 15) 402; see also Oliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Springer 2018) 627; ‘Returning to UNHCR, it can be appreciated that its views, guidelines and interventions could occupy a similar place, even if it is a different type of treaty supervisory body (…)’. Goodwin- Gill, ‘Sources’ (n 36) 31. 67 ‘Resolution 6/2015 (II.25.) of the Constitutional Court on the determination whether the term ‘lawfully’ in section 76(1) of Act II of 2007 on the Conditions of Entry and Stay of Third-Country Nationals is contrary to the Fundamental Act and the annulment thereof’ (25 February 2015) <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5542301a4.html>. 68 This is well stated by ICJ when confirming that pronouncements of the Human Rights Committee are relevant for the purpose of interpreting the ICCPR: ‘Although the Court is in no way obliged, in the exercise of its judicial functions, to model its own interpretation of the Covenant on that of the Committee, it believes that it should ascribe great weight to the interpretation adopted by this independent body (…). The point here is to achieve the necessary clarity and the essential consistency of international law, as well as legal security, to which both the individuals with guaranteed rights and the States obliged to comply with treaty obligations are entitled.’ Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Merits, Judgment (30 November 2010) 664. <https://www. icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/103/103-20101130-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf>. European University Institute 18