2016] The Protection of Stateless Persons in Australian Law 437 On the other hand, there are cases in which the Federal Court has rejected the notion that arbitrary or discriminatory deprivation of nationality is sufficient to constitute persecution at all. For example, in SZTFX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection the Court held that ‘in the context of refusal of nationality, it is not that refusal which could be said to be persecutory but rather the conduct which might flow from it.’189 This issue has not been resolved and reflects a similar divergence of approaches on this issue in jurisprudence globally.190 Given the widely accepted notion that ‘being persecuted’ can be constituted by a sustained or systemic violation of human rights,191 and the fact that arbitrary deprivation of nationality, including on prohibited grounds, is a clear human rights violation,192 the better view is that: short of engineering one’s deprivation of nationality for personal convenience, all deprivation of nationality should lead to a finding of persecution because ‘nationality’ is and continues to be the gateway for the exercise of most basic human rights. Where deprivation of nationality is found to be discriminatory and/or arbitrary, this should lead to finding of persecution for a Convention ground.193 This issue is ripe for further curial analysis, and the reasoning of the United States (‘US’) Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit is instructive in indicating the scope for a more sophisticated approach. In Stserba v Holder,194 that Court considered the asylum claim of a woman of Russian ethnicity whose Estonian 189 (2015) 146 ALD 172, 179 [40] (McKerracher J), quoting SZTFX v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 361 (18 February 2014) [21] (Judge Cameron). 190 See Hélène Lambert, ‘Comparative Perspectives on Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality and Refugee Status’ (2015) 64 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1. 191 Hathaway and Foster, above n 7, 185. 192 The UN Secretary-General’s report to the Human Rights Council in 2009 describes this as a rule of international law: Human Rights Council, Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality: Report of the Secretary-General, 13th sess, Agenda Item 3, UN Doc A/HRC/13/34 (14 December 2009) 5–6 [19]–[22]. The European Court of Human Rights regards it as a breach of art 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953), as amended by Protocol No 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 13 May 2004, CETS No 194 (entered into force 1 June 2010): Kurić v Slovenia [2012] IV Eur Court HR 1, 66–72 [339]–[362]. 193 Refugee Status, UN Doc PPLA/2014/01, 56. Lambert, who authored this document, formed her view by drawing on best practice from the limited international jurisprudence on this issue. 194 646 F 3d 964 (6th Cir, 2011).