The Impact of Climate Change on Statelessness in the Southern African Region that reason, addressing the effects of climate change remains imperative. (a) Low-lying island states (the sinking state problem) The sinking state problem has in the past been regarded as the quintessential example of displacement and statelessness due to the impacts of climate change. The rise in global temperatures has resulted in rising sea levels, which are predicted to rise as much as 1.7 to 2 metres by 2100 and 2 to 3 metres by 2300. More pessimistic estimates predict that a rise of over 2 metres may be possible by 2100.43 For certain low-lying island states, this means the entire state territory may be inundated with water, rendering the land uninhabitable and forcing the displacement of the state’s population.44 Scholars, such as Rouleau-Dick and Farron, opine that these persons may be rendered stateless as their state of origin will cease to exist.45 This opinion is based on the application of the Montevideo Criteria, as laid out in the Montevideo Convention.46 According to these criteria, for a state to exist, it must bear the following characteristics: a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.47 Should a low-lying island state be inundated with water, it will no longer bear all these characteristics, and will therefore cease to be a state. For the previous populations of these island states, once the state itself no longer exists, these persons will be made stateless. However, not all scholars agree that this is the case. It may not be correct to assume that these island states will certainly cease to exist, since they may adopt various adaptation strategies that allow the state to continue. For example, they may construct mechanisms to prevent seawater from overwhelming the island land or may purchase land from an existing state for their population to migrate to, should the island become uninhabitable.48 Even if these states do lose their territory, this does not necessarily mean that they will cease to exist or be recognised as states. First, as McAdam points out, while fulfilment of the Montevideo Criteria is necessary for a state to come into existence, subsequently failing to meet one or more of these criteria does not automatically mean that status is lost.49 In fact, there is a general presumption of continuity that supports the continued existence of these states, even where they lose their physical territory.50 Therefore, we argue that even where the physical territory of these island states is lost, the state itself continues to exist, and the population thereof is not stateless. Etienne Piguet ‘Climatic statelessness: Risk assessment and policy options’ (2019) 45 Population and Development Review at 869. 44 Antonio Joseph DelGrande ‘Statelessness in the context of climate change: The applicability of the Montevideo criteria to “Sinking States”’ (2021) 53 NYUJILP at 153. 45 Michel Rouleau-Dick ‘Sea level rise and climate statelessness: From ‘too little, too late’ to context-based relevance’ (2021) 3 Statelessness & Citizenship Review 287-308; Sue Farron ‘The significance of sea-level rise for the continuation of states and the identity of their people’ (2021) 24 PELJ. 46 Convention on Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention), Art. 1, Dec. 16, 1934, 165 L.N.T.S. 19. 47 Ibid. 48 DelGrande op cit note 44 at 159. 49 Jane McAdam ‘Building international approaches to climate change, disasters and displacement’ (2011) 33 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice at 8. 50 DelGrande op cit note 44 at 155. 43 101