Noora Lori denaturalization, the CJEU may have created an opening for bringing cases of forced attribution of nationality to regional courts. Moreover, the EU commission has already challenged the discretion that member-states have when it comes to attributing nationality under citizenship by investment programmes, referring Malta to the CJEU260 and calling upon all member-states to halt their programs in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.261 Outside of the EU, Susan Akram’s clinical human rights work currently maps regional instruments for combating statelessness across the Middle East and North Africa,262 with the aim of identifying specific clauses within regional legal instruments that can hold states accountable for rendering minority groups stateless. Acosta’s ongoing research on regional mobility frameworks in South America also provides insights on how regional instruments might be leveraged to reign in weaponised citizenship,263 since the proliferation of regional processes of integration coupled with the expansion of human rights law ‘are two of the most important phenomena that have limited the state’s capacity to restrict the entry of foreigners and their rights.’264 In short, while regional mobility agreements have not yet been deployed in cases of weaponised citizenship, they might provide us with a promising avenue for introducing higher standards of protections in the absence of a global legal framework due to the more limited number of actors involved in negotiations. The robust literature on inter-state negotiations and power politics might also be instructive, as scholars have identified a range of extra-legal ways that states can be coerced or incentivized into modifying their behaviour based on the pressures exerted by other states or international entities, especially when different issue areas are interlinked in negotiations. For example, in the realm of economic negotiations and trade agreements, Farrell and Newman develop the concept of “weaponised interdependence” to capture how states weaponise asymmetrical access to global networks of informational and financial exchange for strategic advantage.265 States that have a structural advantage in the system can leverage that advantage for coercive ends through a “panopticon effect” (granting network access to gather strategically valuable information) or conversely a “chokepoint effect” (denying network access to adversaries). Scholars like Greenhill,266 Tsourapas,267 and Adamson268 have documented a similar dynamic in the realm of negotiations over cross-border flows, developing concepts like “migration interdependence” to explain how labour migrants or asylum-seekers are used as pawns when states strategically instigate or interdict human flows to gain leverage over other states.269 The desire to contain migration can make more developed states in the Global North vulnerable, because migrantsending and transit states strategically use migration flows to increase their bargaining power and induce political, military or economic concessions. This can have the effect of giving weaker, less militarily powerful states leverage over states that have superior economic or military capabilities. Even non-state actors like NGOs may have some leverage of this kind. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Sharman’s research shows that NGOs do not only lobby for changes to international law but also act as enforcers on issues of human rights, the environment, and corruption by acting as private police, prosecutors, and intelligence agencies in enforcing international laws and norms.270 260 ‘Investor citizenship scheme: Commission refers MALTA to the Court of Justice’, EU Commission Press release, 29 September 2022, Commission refers MALTA to the Court of Justice (europa.eu). 261 ‘Commission urges Member States to act on ‘golden passports' and ‘golden residence permits' schemes, and to take immediate steps in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine’, EU Commission Press release, 28 March 2022, Commission urges Member States to act on ‘golden passports' (europa.eu). 262 Beyer R., ‘Confronting the Problem of Statelessness’, The Record, 6 November 2020, Confronting the Problem of Statelessness | School of Law (bu.edu). 263 Acosta, D. (2017), ‘Global Migration Law and Regional Free Movement: Compliance and Adjudication – The Case of South America’, AJIL Unbound, 111, 159-164. 264 Id. 265 Farrell H. and Newman A. (2019), ‘Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion’, International Security 44 (1): 42–79. 266 Greenhill K. (2016), Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy, Cornell University Press. 267 Tsourapas G. (2018), ‘Labor Migrants as Political Leverage: Migration Interdependence and Coercion in the Mediterranean’, International Studies Quarterly 62(2) 383–395. 268 Adamson F. and Tsourapas G. (2018), ‘Migration Diplomacy in World Politics’, International Studies Perspectives 0, 1–16. 269 Tsourapas G. (2018), ‘Labor Migrants as Political Leverage: Migration Interdependence and Coercion in the Mediterranean’, International Studies Quarterly 62(2) 383–395. 270 Eilstrup-Sangiovanni M. and Sharman J. (2022), Vigilantes beyond Borders: NGOs as Enforcers of International Law, Princeton University Press. 45 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies