Paper-sword citizenship Many states have moved in recent years to expand access to citizenship on the basis of descent or ethnic affinity. In most cases these initiatives have hardly been worthy of note, at least not from a global perspective. They are in any case almost always uncontested, from both a policy and legal perspective. If states want to make citizenship more widely available, that is generally seen as a good thing. Extraterritorial attribution of citizenship based on descent satisfies the Nottebohm judgment’s “genuine links” test (insofar as that test continues to have traction in the first place).185 Affinity regimes have also been accepted as consistent with international norms; to the extent that they are being questioned, it is not on behalf of those to whom citizenship is extended but rather those who are excluded from the citizenship grant. That Spain, for example, shortens its naturalization residency requirement for nationals of Latin states is a boon for those who secure citizenship under the scheme. It is problematic because it discriminates against those who do not. The interests of other states are generally unaffected by these policies, all of which are premised on the consensual acquisition of citizenship. A notable exception was Viktor Orban’s move to extend citizenship to Hungarian ethnics as ���near kin” in neighbouring states. While the policy does not appear to be oppressive to individuals who have secured citizenship under the policy, it triggered protests from some neighbouring states, as Jain and others have noted.186 As Szabolcs Pogonyi points out, the Orban policy was clearly instrumental, not so much for sovereign but rather political interests (this population votes overwhelmingly for Orban’s Fidesz party).187 But it is not clear how those state interests are diminished in this or other cases so long as other international legal constraints are respected. States that perceive a threat in such actions remain able to prohibit dual citizenship consistent with international law, in which case the acceptance of the external citizenship comes at a high cost. Slovakia, notably, continues to bar resident Slovakians from also holding Hungarian citizenship. Otherwise, the Orban policy has stuck. For most states, as Jelena Džankić suggests, it would be difficult to police against such uses of citizenship without casting doubt on the now-broad recognition of ancestral citizenship and the dual nationality that comes with it.188 Many people who hold the citizenships of their grandparents may not have much connection to that homeland, but that is not doing anyone any harm. Citizenship in this guise is not so much “zombie” as it is phantom. Russia’s passportisation again presents a contrast to the extent that it has been put to work as a pretext for other acts inconsistent with international law, under the guise of protecting its new nationals. That justification has fooled no one. No state has accepted the protection of putative nationals as legitimising the military action. Passportisation has not advanced Russia’s efforts to secure international acceptance of expansionist policies. In other words, it has not been much of a weapon. Back to consent Russia’s practice also goes to the consent questions. The naturalisation of Ukrainians in Crimea has been contested on this score. Crimean residents were extended Russian citizenship by operation of law; although an opt-out procedure was made available, some have argued it was constrained to the point that the automatic naturalization was constructively non-consensual.189 185 186 187 188 189 Macklin, A. (2017), ‘ Is it time to retire Nottebohm?’, AJIL Unbound, 111, 492-497. Bauböck 2010. Pogonyi S. (2017), Extra-Territorial Ethnic Politics, Discourses and Identities in Hungary, Springer Link. Džankić 2022. Human Rights in the Context of Automatic Naturalization in Crimea, Open Society Justice Initiative, June 2018, report-osji-crimea-20180601.pdf (justiceinitiative.org). European University Institute 34