Bronwen Manby The recognition of these limits did not at that time encompass any hint of concern about the rights of the individual people attributed nationality. Thus, Rudolf Graupner could write in 1946 that in nationality matters ‘at most the States concerned may have rights and duties against each other, the individuals merely being the objects of international law’.152 At the time Paul Weis was writing his foundational text on nationality and statelessness in international law – first published in 1956 and updated in 1979 – the view remained much the same. 153 In general, ‘the acquisition of a new nationality must contain an element of voluntariness on the part of the individual acquiring it, [and] must not be conferred against the will of the individual’.154 The remedy, however, remained only in the hands of the states concerned: if nationality was compulsorily imposed against these norms, it was the state of the person’s original nationality that would have the right to intervene on that person’s behalf. Nationality and state succession Aside from the attribution of nationality to children, which only the most radical authors have suggested should not be automatic in any circumstances, the most egregious non-voluntary acquisitions of citizenship occur in the context of state succession, where sovereignty over a territory is transferred by agreement or by conquest. Even in these cases, international law has historically recognized some element of voluntariness. Although the basic rule was understood to be that (subject to other agreement between the parties) nationality was acquired on the basis of habitual residence at the time of transfer of sovereignty, those former residents not physically present within the territory were generally not automatically affected. Others who wanted to reject the new nationality were also able to do so by leaving the territory – although at the cost of statelessness if another nationality was not accessible. These were the basic principles followed in the agreements on nationality after the first and second world wars; nonetheless, the right of option was respected in some cases.155 The especially egregious manipulation of citizenship law by the Nazi regime in Germany provoked more concern. Decrees imposing German nationality on persons living in territories occupied by Germany during the Second World War were regarded as ‘obviously inconsistent with international law’.156 Following the war, both German and other courts also paid attention to the will of the person concerned and the avoidance of undesired outcomes.157 In 1999, the International Law Commission (ILC) adopted Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of States, which moved the needle a degree further towards a consideration of the wishes of those impacted by transfers of territory.158 The ILC articles endorse the starting principle of attribution after state succession based on habitual residence (rather than former nationality), but also propose the possibility of an option, and that ‘States concerned shall give consideration to the will of persons concerned.’ The Council of Europe treaties on nationality adopted in 1997159 and 2006160 follow the same pattern. These instruments apply, however, only to ‘the effects of a succession of States occurring in conformity with international law and, in particular, with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations’.161 How should we consider their relevance to the imposition of nationality in Ukraine? 152 Graupner, R. (1946), ‘Nationality and State Succession General Principles of the Effect of Territorial Changes on Individuals in International Law’, Transactions of the Grotius Society, 32, 87–120. 153 Weis P. (1970), Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Brill. 154 Id. 155 ‘Report on Nationality, Including Statelessness by Mr. Manley O. Hudson’, United Nations Special Rapporteur, A/CN.4/50 (1952). 156 Id. 157 Lasswell H. et. al. (1973), ‘Nationality and Human Rights: The Protection of the Individual in External Arenas’, 83 Yale L.J. 900. 158 Mikulka V., Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of States 1999. 159 European Convention on Nationality, adopted 6 November 1997, entry into force 1 March 2000, ETS No. 166. 160 Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation to State succession, Council of Europe, adopted 19 May 2006, entry into force 1 May 2009, CETS No. 200. 161 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, November 2001, International Law Commission, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1, art.3. 29 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies