Conditions for regulating the weaponisation of citizenship Punishment and pre-emption of weaponisation of citizenship This contribution has asked three key questions that must be taken into account when determining the instances where international law can and should regulate oppressive nationality attribution. My view is that international law will be able to restrict oppressing nationality attribution only in cases where all three questions are affirmatively answered. This is because the current statebased system will not allow regulation of nationality attribution within states nor will it recognize citizenships conferred by non-state actors within the same legal framework (Question 1). Secondly, many states already pursue citizenship policies that allow extraterritorial nationality acquisition on a voluntary and an individual basis, and this practice is generally recognized as legal and legitimate. It is only when the nationality attribution is forceful and carried out en masse that the sovereignty of states becomes challenged and thus must be regulated (Question 2). Lastly, a criminal intent and act aimed at the weaponisation of citizenship must exist for a state to be reprimanded (Question 3). If the weaponisation of citizenship did not happen concurrently with nationality attribution but happened later, then such cases can be addressed by international law only after the weaponisation. I also acknowledge that it may be more challenging to answer the latter two questions affirmatively. Thus, I see the possibility of further nuancing these two conditions to identify which cases can be regulated by international law. That said, I believe the three questions must guide the formulation of any international legal regime on the weaponisation of citizenship. If states agree upon the three conditions, the next question is how transgressing states should be reprimanded. While I do not have concrete solutions, I do believe some of the current solutions are inappropriate. Current responses to passportisation have ranged from banning dual citizenship with neighbouring countries (e.g. Slovakia-Hungary)117 or refusing to recognize travel documents issued by individuals affected by passportisation policies. The EU’s recently announced policy of non-recognition of Russian passports in occupied territories ultimately hurts the people living in these regions, not the Russian state.118 Human rights, including freedom of movement and access to education and healthcare, are affected by not recognizing the travel documents. By adopting such an approach, the EU and other states further push the passportised individuals into Russia’s grasp. An alternative approach would be to look at why some instances of weaponised citizenship occurred in the first place. In Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia could eventually weaponise citizenship because the people of these territories had no other option. Had the international system and the base state created mechanisms to address the demands of the local populations, we might not be in the current situation. While the idea may be radical, in aspirant states, the solution is to recognize the passports of these territories as valid travel documents. This would remove the incentives for these populations to seek more powerful passports for compensatory reasons. Thus, my proposition for dealing with the weaponisation of citizenship is to create mechanisms where individuals living in contested territories and possessing weak passports can more easily travel and gain access to education and healthcare. Had the international community provided a solution in the 1990s for Abkhazians and South Ossetians to travel more easily there would have been a lesser demand for Russian passports. Moreover, had the Abkhazian and Ossetian passports been recognized as travel documents, the demand for Russian citizenship would have dropped even further. This could have reduced Russia’s grasp over the region and encouraged these regions to adopt a multi-vector approach rather than be forced to get closer to their only partner – Russia. By isolating these populations and restricting their freedoms, Georgia (and the EU/West) also contributed to the inevitable passportisation. So, they must also take some responsibility. 117 Bauböck R. (2010), Dual citizenship for transborder minorities? How to respond to the Hungarian-Slovak tit-for-tat, EUDO Citizenship Observatory Working Paper, EUI RSCAS, 2010/75 (hereinafter ‘Bauböck 2010’). 118 ‘The EU will not recognize Russian passports issued in the occupied territories of Georgia and Ukraine’, JAM News, 13 October 2022, EU does not recognize Russian passports in Abkhazia, JAMnews (jam-news.net). European University Institute 22